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EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
W. Wendell Hall*
Philip J. Pfeiffer**
URING the last year of the Bush administration, the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 be-
came effective. These statutes, which have expanded both the scope
of claims and the range of penalties for employment discrimination, have
resulted in increased civil rights litigation in the federal courts. Under the
Clinton administration, employers expect to see a significant amount of leg-
islation introduced proposing broader rights and remedies for employees for
employment discrimination. In just the first thirty days of the Clinton Ad-
ministration, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 was enacted by
Congress and signed into law. Further legislative developments with respect
to employee benefits, civil rights and traditional labor-management issues
are almost certain to follow.
Notwithstanding these developments within our federal system, the focus
of Texas employers is upon the Texas state courts. The Texas courts con-
tinue to wrestle with wrongful discharge claims which seek to avoid or mod-
ify the employment-at-will rule. Recent decisions in Texas and in other
states, however, have evidenced serious reservations concerning further judi-
cial erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine.I The courts have generally
* Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., San Antonio. B.A. The University of Texas;
J.D. St. Mary's University.
** Managing Partner, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., San Antonio. B.S. Sam Houston
State University; J.D. Southern Methodist University.
The authors wish to express their sincere appreciation to Diana S. Reyes, legal secretary at
Fulbright & Jaworski, for her dedication and hard work in typing and proofreading this article
this year and each year since 1988.
1. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1040 (Ariz. 1985) (fun-
damental change in employment-at-will doctrine should not be result of judicial decision);
Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 397 n.31 (Cal. 1988) ("Legislatures, in making
such policy decisions, have the ability to gather empirical evidence, solicit the advice of ex-
perts, and hold hearings at which all interested parties may present evidence and express their
views .... ); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) ("[C]ourts
should proceed cautiously if called upon to declare public policy ...."); Adler v. American
Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 472 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) ("declaration of public policy is
normally the function of the legislative branch"); Melnick v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 1105, 1109, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988) (discussing exceptions to general em-
ployment at will doctrine); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90
(N.Y. 1983) ("If the rule of nonliability for termination for of at-will employment is to be
tempered, it should be accomplished through a principled statutory scheme, adopted after
opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in consequence of judicial resolution of the
partisan arguments of individual adversarial litigants. . . . The Legislature has infinitely
greater resources and procedural means to discern the public will, to examine the variety of
pertinent considerations, to elicit the views of the various segments of the community that
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reasoned that if the well-established doctrine of employment-at-will is to be
modified, such action should be taken by elected legislative representatives,
not the judiciary.
Employers should take little comfort in these decisions. Resourceful and
innovative plaintiffs' counsel, in a seemingly endless effort to identify tort
theories of liability that will support both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, have advanced a panoply of causes of action generally referred to as
employment or workplace torts. Claims for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, defamation, invasion of privacy and the like are regularly
combined with contract based theories of liability and, in many instances,
with claims of discrimination. Additionally, these employment tort actions
are not limited in their application to discharge claims. These actions are
also advanced as a means of challenging a wide array of conduct occurring
at the workplace. Developments in employment law are occurring in Texas
and throughout the United States and deserve careful attention and study by
employers and their counsel.
I. EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE
The employment-at-will doctrine provides that employment for an indefi-
nite term may be terminated at will and without cause, absent an agreement
to the contrary. 2 Although the Texas legislature has enacted statutory ex-
ceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, 3 the doctrine has remained in-
would be directly affected [sic] and in any event critically interested, and to investigate and
anticipate the impact of imposition of such liability."); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335
N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) ("Courts should proceed cautiously when making public policy
determinations"); Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). The
Whittaker court stated:
[A]ny substantial change in the employee-at-will rule should first be microscopi-
cally analyzed regarding its effect on the commerce of this state. There must
first be protection from substantial impairment of the very legitimate interests of
an employer in hiring and retaining the most qualified personnel available or the
very foundation of the free enterprise system could be jeopardized. . . . Tennes-
see has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of new industry of
high quality designed to increase the average per capita income of its citizens
and thus, better the quality of their lives. The impact on the continuation of such
influx of new businesses should be carefully considered before any substantial
modification is made in the employee-at-will rule.
Id. at 396-97 (emphasis added).
2. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530, 531 (Feb. 3,
1993) (per curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991);
Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990) (citing East
Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)).
3. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4512.7, § 3 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for re-
fusing to participate in an abortion); Id. arts. 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge for mem-
bership or nonmembership in a union; Id. art. 5182b, § 15 (Vernon 1987) (discharge for
exercising rights under Hazard Communication Act); Id. art. 5196g (Vernon 1987) (discharge
for refusing to make purchase from employer's store); Id. art. 5207a (Vernon 1987) (discharge
based on union membership or nonmembership); Id. art. 5207c (Vernon Supp. 1990) (dis-
charge for complying with a subpoena); Id. art. 5221k, § 5.01 (Vernon 1987) (Commission on
Human Rights Act) (discharge based on race, color, handicap, religion, national origin, age, or
sex); Id. art 5221k, § 5.05(a) (Vernon 1989) (discharge for reporting violations of the Commis-
sion on Human Rights Act); Id. art. 5547-300, § 9 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge due to
mental retardation); Id. art. 6252-16a, §§ 2-4 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge of public em-
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tact, with only one narrow public policy exception, for the last 105 years.4
In 1985, the Texas Supreme Court created the only exception to the at-will
doctrine in Sabine Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck5 in which the court held pub-
ployee for reporting violation of law to appropriate enforcement authority); Id. art. 8307c
(Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge based on good faith workers' compensation claim); TEX.
AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 125.001 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for exercising rights under
Agricultural Hazard Communication Act); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 122.001
(Vernon 1986) (discharge for jury service); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 161.007 (Vernon 1986)
(discharge for attending political convention); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.43(m) (Vernon
Supp. 1990) (discharge due to withholding order for child support); TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.
§§ 431.005-431.006 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge for military service); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 242.133 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (discharge of nursing home employee for
reporting abuse or neglect of a resident).
There are also numerous federal statutory exceptions to an employer's right to discharge an
employee at-will. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, 29 U.S.C. § 626; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1981a, 1988, 2000e, 2000e-1, 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-16, 12111,12112 and 12209 (West Supp.
1992) (discharge based on discrimination); National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988) (discharge for union activity, protected concerted activity or filing
charges or giving testimony); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1988 &
Supp. 1 1989) (discharge for exercising rights guaranteed by the minimum wage and overtime
provisions of the Act); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-
634 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discharge based on discrimination); Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988) (discharge of employees for exercising rights
under the Act); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-796i (West 1988 & Supp.
1992) (discharge on basis of disability in programs receiving federal funds); Employment Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140-1141 (1988) (discharge of employees
to prevent them from attaining vested pension rights); Civil Rights Act of 1866, 1870 and
1871, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1981, 1982, 1985-1992, 1994-1996 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992) (discharge
for discriminatory reasons); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e,
2000e-16 (West 1981 & Supp. 1992) (discharge on the basis of race, sex, pregnancy, national
origin or religion); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12108 (West
1991 & Supp. 1992).
4. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991); Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 726; Sabine Pilot
Serv., Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985); East Line & R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72
Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 838 S.W.2d 804,
808 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992) affirmed in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct.
J. 530 (Feb. 3, 1993); Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1992, writ denied); McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 664
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d
340, 342 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied). See also Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980
F.2d 995, 1000 (5th Cir. 1993) (employment-at-will doctrine well settled in Texas); Crum v.
American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 426 (5th Cir. 1991) (at-will doctrine alive and well in
Texas); Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267
(1992) (recognizing only one exception to at-will doctrine in Texas); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt
Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991) (Texas courts
continue to follow historical at-will rule); Spiller v. Ella Smithers Geriatric Ctr., 919 F.2d 339,
345 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas Supreme Court "has decided that a public policy halo surrounds
the at-will employee doctrine"); Manning v. Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1989)
(Texas courts not hesitant to declare employment-at-will doctrine alive and well); Knerr v.
Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Tex. July 28, 1992) (Texas follows the
employment-at-will doctrine); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 6-7
(N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will rule in Texas); Perez v. Vinnell
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (recognizing long-standing at-will doctrine in
Texas); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990)
(Texas courts have continuously recognized employment-at-will rule); Scott v. Vetco Gray,
Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 1990) (at-will doctrine remains firmly
entrenched in Texas common law).
5. 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985). In 1989, the Texas Supreme Court in McClendon v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand,
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lic policy, as expressed in the laws of Texas and the United States which
carry criminal penalties, requires an exception to the employment-at-will
doctrine when an employee has been discharged for refusing to perform a
criminally illegal act ordered by his employer. 6 Since Sabine Pilot, many
discharged employees have unsuccessfully tried to bring their claim of
wrongful discharge within that exception.7
807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991), created a short-lived second exception and held that public policy
favoring the integrity in pension plans requires an exception to the employment-at-will doc-
trine when an employee proves that the principal reason for his discharge was the employer's
desire to avoid contributing to or paying for benefits under the employee's pension fund. Id. at
7 1. The United States Supreme Court, however, held that ERISA preempted the McClendon
common law cause of action. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990). In
1990, the Texas Supreme Court declined an opportunity to expand the public policy exception
in Sabine Pilot or to adopt a private whistle blower exception to the at-will doctrine. Winters
v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 723 (Tex. 1990). The Texas Whistle
Blower Act, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-16a, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (protects
state employees from adverse employment decisions for reporting, in good faith, violation of
law to an appropriate law enforcement authority). For a complete discussion of Winters, see
Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 331, 334-36 (1991). Assuming that the Texas Supreme Court eventually
recognizes a second exception to the at-will doctrine to protect private employees from adverse
employment decisions for reporting in good faith a violation of law to an appropriate law
enforcement authority, see Winters, 795 S.W.2d at 725, such a cause of action will probably
generate a significant amount of litigation. See Texas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Green, 1993
Tex. App. LEXIS 774, at *40 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 17, 1993, n.w.h.) (affirming award of
$13,500,000 to a state employee for reporting wrongdoings within his agency); Janacek v. Tri-
ton Energy Corp., No. 90-07220-M (298th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., May 22, 1991) (jury
awarded $124,000,000 to a former employee who was discharged for refusing to sign an annual
report allegedly containing misleading information). See also City of Houston v. Leach, 819
S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (employee recovered dam-
ages after being discharged from employment for reporting violations of law to the appropriate
authorities); Lastor v. City of Hearne, 810 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ
denied) (city employee discharged for reporting violation of law recovered damages under
Texas Whistle Blower Act).
6. Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735; see Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 1160, 1171 n.16
(5th Cir. 1988) affd 112 S. Ct. 1076 (1992) ("Sabine Pilot can be reasonably read as restricted
to instances where the violations of law the employee refused to commit 'carry criminal penal-
ties' " (quoting Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735)). But see Johnston v. Del Mar Distributing
Co., Inc., 776 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied). In Del Mar, the
court held that
the Sabine Pilot exception necessarily covers a situation where an employee has
a good faith belief that her employer has requested her to perform an act which
may subject her to criminal penalties. Public policy demands that she be al-
lowed to investigate into whether such actions are legal so that she can deter-
mine what course of action to take (i.e., whether or not to perform the act).
Id. at 771.
7. Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723 at 724-25 (Tex. 1990)
(Texas Supreme Court declined to extend Sabine Pilot to cover employees who reported illegal
activities); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
granted on other grounds) (employee who claimed discharge was due to her possession of
information that could implicate the company in criminal misconduct did not state claim
under Sabine Pilot); Paul v. P.B.-K.B.B., Inc., 801 S.W.2d 229, 230 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharge due to objections to exploratory shaft for a
nuclear waste storage project for Department of Energy not within Sabine Pilot); Hancock v.
Express One Int'l, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 634, 636-37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied) (court
declined to extend Sabine Pilot to include employees discharged for performing illegal acts
which carry civil penalties); Burt v. City of Burkburnett, 800 S.W.2d 625, 626-27 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (claim of discharged police officer that discharge was the result
of his refusal to not arrest a prominent citizen for public intoxication and thus refusing to
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A. COMMON LAW CLAIMS
When the term of employment is left to the discretion of either party or is
left indefinite, either party may terminate the contract at will and without
cause. 8 During the past several years, however, wrongful discharge litiga-
tion based on the violation of a written or oral employment agreement has
increased. Written or oral employment agreements may indeed modify the
at-will rule and require the employer to have good cause for the discharge of
an employee. 9
1. Written Agreements
To avoid the employment-at-will doctrine and establish a cause of action
for wrongful termination based on a written contract, an employee must
prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically prohibited
the employer from terminating the employee's service at-will.10 The written
contract must provide in a special and meaningful way that the employer
does not have the right to terminate the employment relationship at will."1
perform an illegal act not within Sabine Pilot). See also e.g., Pease, 980 F.2d at 996 (amended
complaint that failed to allege that plaintiff was ordered to violate laws that carried criminal
penalties does not state claim under Sabine Pilot); Guthrie, 941 F.2d at 379 (claim that plaintiff
was instructed to violate unspecified customs regulations does not state claim under Sabine
Pilot); Aitkens v. Arabian American Oil Co., No. 90-2884, slip op. at 3 (5th Cir. June 14, 1991)
(not published) (dentist's contention that he was fired for refusing to violate ethical or profes-
sional standards or to engage in tortious activities was insufficient under Sabine Pilot); Willy,
855 F.2d at 1171 n. 16 (Sabine Pilot exception is limited to cases where the violations of law
which the employee refused to commit carry criminal penalties); Gallagher v. Mansfield Scien-
tific, Inc., No. H-90-2999, slip op. at 4-5 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 1991) (plaintiff's refusal to sell
inter-aortic balloons he believed to be defective, unreasonably dangerous and presenting risk of
death or serious bodily injury was not within the Sabine Pilot exception); Haynes v. Henry S.
Miller Management Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (dis-
charge in retaliation for reporting illegal fraudulent expense reports of former high-ranking
management employees not within Sabine Pilot exception); McCain v. Target Stores, No. H-
89-0140, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1990) (discharge in retaliation for investigating falsifi-
cation of time cards by another employee not within Sabine Pilot exception).
8. E.g., Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530, 531 (Feb. 3,
1993) (per curiam); Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991);
East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 577 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836
S.W.2d 664, 667 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted); see also Philip J. Pfeiffer &
W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 42 Sw. L.J. 97,
98-99 nn. 8 & 9 (1988) (citing several cases that discuss the employment-at-will doctrine).
9. East Line, 72 Tex. at 75, 10 S.W. at 102; Goodyear Tire, 836 S.W.2d at 667-68; cf.
Sabine Pilot, 687 S.W.2d at 735 (court held that an at-will employee may not be terminated for
refusing to commit illegal act; noting statutory limitations on employment-at-will doctrine).
See generally Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-941 (1988) (employees of the state are generally at-
will employees).
10. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65,
68 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied); Wilhite v. H. E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843,
846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728
S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ refd n.r.e.); Webber v. M. W. Kellogg
Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also
Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
591 (1991) (applying Texas law).
11. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577; McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d 816,
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The necessity of a written contract arises from the statute of frauds require-
ment that an agreement which is not to be performed within one year from
the date of the making must be in writing to be enforceable.' 2
An employer's letter to an employee regarding his position or salary
(stated per week, month or year) may provide a basis upon which the em-
ployee may argue that there is a written employment contract; however, the
cases are somewhat difficult to reconcile and appear to be decided on the
specific facts of each case. 13 Another basis for avoiding the employment-at-
will doctrine is the argument that an employee handbook or employment
818 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69, 70 (Tex.
1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1991) (quoting Be-
noit, 728 S.W.2d at 406); Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d at 846; Webber v. M.
W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d at 127; Knerr v. Neiman Marcus, Inc., No. H-90-3641 (S.D. Tex.
July 28, 1992); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-H, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Tex. June
17, 1991); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex. 1989).
In Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124, the court held that to establish a cause of
action for wrongful discharge, the discharged employee must prove that there was a written
employment agreement that specifically provided that the employer did not have the right to
terminate the contract at will. Id. at 126. In Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406, the court added that
the writing must "in a meaningful and special way" limit the employer's right to terminate the
employment at will. But cf. Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 311 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (court suggested that the phrase "in a special and meaningful
way" is not a necessary part of analysis).
12. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)(6) (Vernon 1987); Rodriguez, 716 F. Supp.
at 277; Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Winograd, 789
S.W.2d at 310-11 (citing Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied)); Stiver,
750 S.W.2d at 846; Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 406.
13. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577 (citing general rule). See Winograd, 789 S.W.2d at 310
(letter confirming employment and annual salary held to be a contract of employment); Dob-
son v. Metro Label Corp., 786 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (memoran-
dum reflecting annual salary held insufficient to constitute a contract); W. Pat Crow Forgings,
Inc. v. Casarez, 749 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (letter agree-
ment promoting employee to supervisor and assuring employee that he could return to previ-
ous position if he was not a satisfactory supervisor protected employee from at-will
termination); Dech v. Daniel, Mann, Johnson & Mendenhall, 748 S.W.2d 501, 503 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (employer's subsequent confirmation letter regarding
employment and employee's annual salary held not to be a written contract); see also Molnar
v. Engels, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 224, 225 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (demand
for annual salary indicates plaintiff assumed his employment agreement was for one-year
term); Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983, writ
refd n.r.e.) (letter stating the salary and length of employment equated to a contract for term
of employment); Culkin v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 354 S.W.2d 397, 400-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd) (letter presented jury question as to terms of employment); Dallas
Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1947, writ refd n.r.e.)
(letter contemplating at least one year of employment together with plaintiff's detrimental reli-
ance on contents of letter presented jury question); Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902,
905-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1930, no writ) (without specified period of service, the deter-
mination is fact sensitive). In Sornson v. Ingram Petroleum Servs., Inc., No. H-86-3923 (S.D.
Tex. Dec. 2, 1987), the plaintiff was offered employment in a letter stating that he would be
paid "at a rate of $58,000 per year." After nine months of employment, the plaintiff was
discharged and he sued for breach of contract. The court stated that the sole issue was
whether, under Texas law, an offer of employment promising compensation and an annual rate
creates, upon acceptance, an employment contract for a one-year term, or whether such lan-
guage merely establishes a rate of pay under a contract of unlimited duration. The court held




application constitutes a contractual modification of the at-will relation-
ship. 14 The Texas courts, however, have adhered to the general rule that
employee handbooks do not constitute written employment agreements, pro-
vided the handbooks (1) give the employer the right to unilaterally amend or
withdraw the handbook, (2) contain an express disclaimer that the hand-
book constitutes an employment contract, or (3) do not include an express
agreement mandating specific procedures for discharging employees.' 5
Therefore, employee claims of a contractual modification of the at-will rela-
tionship based on a handbook have generally been unsuccessful.' 6 However,
once the employee meets his burden of establishing that the contract of em-
ployment is for a term, the employer has the burden to establish good cause
for the discharge.' 7
In Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge,'8 Ben Hatridge sued Day & Zim-
14. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 69 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d 410, 413 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); Stiver, 750 S.W.2d at 846; Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp.,
No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at
842; Glagola v. North Texas Municipal Water Dist., 705 F. Supp. 1220, 1224 (E.D. Tex.
1989); Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 622 (W.D. Tex. 1988); Ab-
ston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 156 (E.D. Tex. 1987); see also Brian K. Lowry,
The Vestiges of the Texas Employment-At- Will Doctrine in the Wake of Progressive Law: The
Employment Handbook Exception, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 327 (1986) (applying principles of con-
sideration and mutuality to employment handbooks).
15. McAlister v. Medina Elec. Co-op, Inc. 830 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied); Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 827 S.W.2d 361, 370 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299,
302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied); Musquiz v. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Mar-
keting Co., No. 04-88-00093-CV (Tex. App.-San Antonio July 12, 1989, no writ) (not desig-
nated for publication); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, Inc., 754 S.W.2d
at 413; Stiver v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1988, no writ); Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber, 720 S.W.2d at 128; Berry v. Doctor's
Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Totman v. Control
Data Corp., 707 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ); Vallone v. Agip
Petroleum Co., 705 S.W.2d 757, 758 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ refd n.r.e.);
Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no
writ); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1991); Zimmerman v. H.
E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d at 471-72; Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462-63
(5th Cir. 1991); Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9; Manning v.
Upjohn Co., 862 F.2d 545, 547 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989); Joachim v. AT & T Information Sys., 793
F.2d 113, 114 (5th Cir. 1986); Blinker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. SA-88-CA-1256, 1991
WL 329563, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 5, 1991); Morton v. Southern Union Co., No. 3-89-0939-
H, slip op. at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1991); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01
(S.D. Tex. 1991); Bowser, 714 F. Supp. at 842; Valdez v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F.
Supp. at 622; Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. at 156. But see Texas Health Enters.,
Inc. v. Gentry, 787 S.W.2d 604, 608 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, no writ) (oral representation
and portion of employee handbook supported breach of contract finding). Contra Aiello v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 818 F.2d 1196, 1199-1200 (5th Cir. 1987) (Fifth Circuit found a con-
tract modifying at-will rule where employee handbook included detailed procedures for disci-
pline and discharge and expressly recognized an obligation to discharge only for good cause).
16. Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d at 69; McClendon v. Ingersoll-
Rand Co., 757 S.W.2d at 818.
17. Lee-Wright, Inc. v. Hall, 840 S.W.2d 572, 573 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ) (citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.)).
18. 831 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ denied).
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merman for wrongful discharge arising out of a written contract. Hatridge
alleged that he had a written contract with Day & Zimmerman because he
completed a job application and Day & Zimmerman sent him its Rules of
Conduct, an insurance policy, and a verification of its retirement plan. The
Rules of Conduct provided that "[ilt is contrary to Company policy for an
employee to be unjustly penalized; therefore, no disciplinary action will be
taken without due and proper investigation. During the investigation the
accused employee will be given full opportunity to present his own defense."
The jury found that a contract existed. The court of appeals reversed and
held that an application for employment, handbooks, employer's policies,
and other related documents do not constitute a contract limiting an em-
ployer's right to terminate an employee at will.1 9 The court also held that
the company's disciplinary policy, unaccompanied by an express agreement,
does not create a contract. 20 Finally, the court observed that Day & Zim-
merman reserved the right to unilaterally amend the Rules of Conduct. 21
Accordingly, the court held that there was no evidence to support the jury's
finding of an employment contract. 22
Similarly, in Almazan v. United Services Automobile Association,23 Yo-
landa Almazan was fired from USAA because she had not kept the company
informed of her medical status after her injury. Almazan sued USAA and
alleged that USAA breached her employment contract because USAA
agreed that she would not be discharged except for good cause. Almazan
relied on a USAA manual that identifies the procedures for handling em-
ployee sickness and lists the grounds for dismissal. 24 USAA moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis that Almazan was an at-will employee and
could not sue for breach of contract. The trial court granted USAA's mo-
tion and the court of appeals affirmed.2 5 On appeal, Almazan relied on
Aiello v. United Air Lines, Inc. 26 for the proposition that established proce-
19. Id. at 69 (citing Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Reynolds Mfg. Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ)).
20. Id. (citing Salazar v. Amigos Del Valle, 754 S.W.2d at 410, 413 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1988, no writ)).
21. Id. at 69-70 (citing Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d at 539).
22. Id. at 70.
23. 840 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
24. After listing the various grounds for dismissal, the manual reaffirmed the at-will status
of employees: "These examples are not all inclusive of offenses which can occur in the work
environment; such a list would be limitless. Additionally, termination may be initiated by
U.S.A.A. at any time, with or without cause and with or without notice." Id. at 780.
25. Id. at 777.
26. 818 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1987). In Aiello, a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit held that
when an employee handbook (1) contains detailed procedures for discipline and discharge; and
(2) expressly recognizes an obligation to discharge only for good cause, the handbook may
constitute a contract modifying the at-will relationship. Id. at 1198. In Aiello, the employee
handbook included a statement that it was not a contract and that employment was at-will.
The court, however, focused on three factors in finding that the handbook was an employment
agreement that modified the employment-at-will relationship: (1) the employee manual con-
tained not only detailed procedures for discipline and discharge but also an obligation to dis-
charge only for good cause; (2) the employer followed these procedures and notified the
employee that she was entitled to them; and (3) the supervisor who discharged the employee
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dures and employer conduct can negate express disclaimers that a handbook
does not constitute a contract. The court noted, however, that in Aiello the
employer stipulated in the pretrial order that the handbook provided that
the employee could only be discharged for good cause. 27 The Almazan court
held that the facts of Aiello were not inconsistent with settled principles of
Texas law. Additionally, to the extent that Aiello may be contrary to those
principles, the Almazan court concluded that Aiello does not accurately set
forth Texas law.28 The court concluded that the manual expressly preserved
the at will relationship and did not restrict USAA's right to terminate Al-
mazan's employment at will. 29
In Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann,30 Marcie Dutschmann, upon her
employment, received an Employment Handbook and Personnel Policy and
Procedure manual that expressly stated that her employment was at-will,
that it would continue as long as it was mutually satisfactory to both parties,
that the manual created no contractual rights, that it could be modified or
withdrawn at any time, and that the manual was intended only as a guide.
The manual stated that "the policies and procedures set forth in this manual
provide guidelines for management and employees during employment, but
do not create contractual rights regarding termination or otherwise." 3'
Dutschmann acknowledged receipt of the manual in writing noting that she
understood that it was not a contract and that the information may be
changed by the company from time to time. The Guaranteed Fair Treat-
ment Policy in the manual stated that the company provided an internal
grievance process to all discharged employees to receive a review of their
termination. Dutschmann availed herself of the review process all the way
to the Board of Review, a final discretionary review granted by the com-
pany's chief executive officer. During the review, Dutschmann alleged that
she was fired in retaliation for making sexual harassment complaints against
considered the provisions of the employee manual to be a contractual obligation. Id. at 1198-
1201. Significantly, the employer in Aiello stipulated that its personnel policies prohibited it
from discharging an employee without good cause. Id. at 1198.
27. Almazan, 840 S.W.2d at 781.
28. Id. See Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, writ denied) (distinguished Aiello rather than decided if it was correct). The incongruity
between Aiello and Joachim v. AT & T Info. Systems, 793 S.W.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1986), and an
analysis of other Texas cases establishes Aiello as an aberration and not a correct interpretation
of Texas law. Aiello, 818 F.2d at 1203-04 (Jones, J., dissenting). See also Zimmerman v. H. E.
Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991)
(noting that the Texas courts have yet to decide whether Aiello is a correct interpretation of
Texas law); Ramos v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., No. L-85-85 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 1987) (Kazen,
J.) (recognizing that Aiello and Joachim could not be reconciled). See also Crum v. American
Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing Aiello as an "exceedingly close
case"); Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1727 (1992) (questioning validity of Aiello).
29. Almazan, 840 S.W.2d at 781 (citing Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200
(S.D. Tex. 1991); Wilhite v. H. E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991,
no writ); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990,
writ denied); Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ)).
30. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530 (Feb. 3, 1993) (per curiam).
31. Id. at 531.
19931 1401
SMU LAW REVIEW
a co-worker several years earlier. The Board of Review upheld
Dutschmann's discharge, and she filed suit for wrongful discharge. The jury
found that Dutschmann was discharged in retaliation for filing claims of
sexual harassment against fellow employees; that the company contracted to
provide a Guaranteed Fair Treatment Procedure (GFTP) to Dutschmann,
and that the company breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
conduct of the GFTP. The jury awarded actual damages on the breach of
contract and retaliatory discharge claims and punitive damages on the
breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing claim. The court of appeals
affirmed. 32 The supreme court affirmed the actual damages award based on
retaliatory discharge, but reversed and rendered judgment for the company
as to Dutschmann's breach of contract claim and the punitive damages
award based on the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 33
The court held that the disclaimer in Federal Express's employee hand-
book negated any implication that the employee manual modified or re-
stricted the employment-at-will relationship. 34 The supreme court rejected
the court of appeals' distinction between employee handbooks that establish
policies during employment and those that grant post-termination rights be-
cause such a distinction ignored the company's explicit disclaimer in the
Personnel Policy and Procedure manual that outlined the GFTP available
for discharged employees. 35 While the court held that there was no contract
restricting the employment-at-will relationship, the actual damages award
was affirmed based upon the jury's affirmative finding of retaliatory
discharge.36
Employment contracts may also modify the at-will rule. In Lee- Wright,
Inc. v. Hall,3 7 Frank Hall, located in Houston, and Lee-Wright, located in
Fort Worth, entered into a contract in 1987 for the sale of Hall's floor cover-
ing business. Lee-Wright wanted to open a branch office in Houston. The
contract provided that Lee-Wright would employ Hall to manage the Hous-
ton office for five years at a salary of $2,000 per month, plus hospital bene-
32. 838 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992).
33. Federal Express, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 532. Because there was no finding of actual
tort damages to support the punitive damages award, the court held that Dutschmann was not
entitled to any award of punitive damages. Id. (citing Texas Nat'l Bank v. Karnes, 717 S.W.2d
901, 903 (Tex. 1986); Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986);
Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Brown, 704 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. 1986); Doubleday &
Co. v. Rogers, 674 S.W.2d 751, 753-54 (Tex. 1984)).
34. Id. at 531 (citing Wilhite v. H. E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, no writ); Hicks v. Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 302 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1990, writ denied); Berry v. Doctor's Health Facilities, 715 S.W.2d 60, 61-62 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Grocery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 471 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991); Perez v. Vinnell Corp., 763 F. Supp. 199, 200-01
(S.D. Tex 1991); White v. Federal Express Corp., 729 F. Supp. 1536, 1547-49 (E.D. Va. 1990),
afl'd, 939 F.2d 157 (4th Cir 1991); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.
Tex. 1989); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 21 (1979); Mark G. Yudof, Contorts
and the Muddled Quest for Bright Lines, STATE BAR OF TEXAS ADVANCED CIVIL TRIAL
COURSE § MM-8 (1991)).
35. Id. at 532.
36. Id.
37. 840 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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fits, and ten percent of the net profits of the Houston branch. In March
1988, Hall injured his shoulder on the job and the company submitted a
workers' compensation report. In May, Hall informed the company by
memorandum that he would be admitted to the hospital on June 10, that he
expected to be away approximately four days, and that he would then know
how long he would be unable to return to work. Hall reiterated this message
by telephone on June 9. Hall was hospitalized June 10-13 and re-admitted in
July for a total of seven days. By letter dated July 14, Hall was informed
that his employment with Lee-Wright had been terminated. Hall sued Lee-
Wright for wrongful discharge. The jury found for Hall and judgment was
rendered for approximately $100,000. Lee-Wright appealed and the court of
appeals affirmed.38
The court observed that the general rule in Texas is that employment is at-
will. 39 The court also noted that Texas follows the general rule which pro-
vides that hiring at a stated sum per week, month or year is definite employ-
ment for the period named and may not be ended at-will.40 To establish a
claim for wrongful discharge, the court stated that Hall had the burden to
prove that he and his employer had a contract that specifically provided that
the employer did not have the right to terminate the employment at-will and
that the employment contract was in writing if the contract exceeded one
year in duration.41 The court further observed that the writing must limit
the employer's right to terminate the employment at-will "in a meaningful
and special way."' 42 Citing Winograd v. Willis, 43 the Lee- Wright court held
that employment based upon an annual salary limits an employer's preroga-
tive "in a meaningful and special way" to terminate an employee during the
period stated." Because Hall's employment was not subject to the at-will
doctrine, the court held that Lee-Wright had the burden to establish good
cause for the discharge.45 The court observed that "[a]n employee's act con-
stitutes good cause for discharge if it is inconsistent with the continued exist-
38. Id. at 575.
39. Id. at 577 (citing McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 779 S.W.2d at 70; East Line &
R.R.R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 75, 10 S.W. 99, 102 (1888)).
40. Id. (citing Dallas Hotel Co. v. Lackey, 203 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1947, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
41. Id. (citing Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 538, 539 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied); Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124,
126 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref d n.r.e.)).
42. Id. (quoting Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
43. 789 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
44. Lee-Wright, 840 S.W.2d at 577.
45. Id. at 578 (citing Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in submitting to the jury the following definition of good cause: "Good cause means
the employee's failure to perform the duties in the scope of employment that a person of ordi-
nary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances." Id. at 578 (citing
Dixie Glass Co. v. Pollak, 341 S.W.2d 530, 541-42 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1960, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)). The court, however, suggested the better submission would be to submit the issue
directly inquiring as to whether there was substantial performance, accompanied by a defini-
tion as to what constitutes substantial performance. Id.
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ence of the employer-employee relationship."' 46 In response to Lee-Wright's
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court held that the jury's
finding that Hall was not discharged for good cause was supported by the
record. The court concluded that Lee-Wright failed to sustain its burden of
proving that Hall failed to perform his duties as a reasonable person would
have done under the same or similar circumstances. 47
Lee-Wright also challenged the award of damages to Hall. The court
noted that the correct measure of damages for wrongful discharge is the
present cash value of the contract if it had not been breached, less any
amounts that the employee should in the exercise of reasonable diligence be
able to earn through other employment. 48 Because Hall was age 70 at the
time of trial and 80% disabled, Hall did not seek other employment. The
court affirmed the damage award and concluded that the jury could have
found that no other employment could have been obtained by the use of
reasonable diligence under the circumstances. 49 Finally, Lee-Wright com-
plained that the trial court erred in failing to deduct from Hall's damage
award the workers' compensation benefits and lump sum settlement received
by Hall. The court of appeals held that Lee-Wright was not entitled to a set-
off for the benefits received by Hall because the fact that Hall received com-
pensation for his work-related injury has no relevance to the issue whether
Lee-Wright discharged Hall without good cause. 50
2. Oral Modifications of the Employment-at- Will Doctrine
Usually, an employment relationship is created when employee and em-
ployer orally agree to the terms and conditions of employment. Oral em-
ployment contracts, however, may defeat an employer's right to terminate
an employee depending upon the terms of the agreement and the facts and
circumstances surrounding the employment.
An employee may avoid the at-will rule when an employer enters into an
oral agreement which the employee will be terminated only for good cause.5'
An employee may also allege that the employer's oral assurance of employ-
ment for a specified period of time (greater than one year) creates an enforce-
46. Id. at 580 (citing Dixie Glass, 341 S.W.2d at 541-43).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 580-81 (citing Gulf Consolidated Int'l, Inc. v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565, 566
(Tex. 1983); Greater Fort Worth & Tarrant County Action Agency v. Mims, 627 S.W.2d 149,
151 (Tex. 1982)). The court recognized that Hall had a duty to mitigate his damages, i.e.,
using reasonable diligence to seek other employment. Id. The court observed that if the em-
ployee uses reasonable diligence and is unable to obtain other employment, proof of that fact
suffices to show the employee's duty has been fulfilled. Id. (citing Kramer v. Wolf Cigar Stores
Co., 99 Tex. 597, 91 S.W. 775, 777 (1906)).
49. Id. at 581.
50. Id. at 582.
51. Mansell v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 135 Tex. 31, 137 S.W.2d 997, 999-1000 (1940); Good-
year Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 667-68 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992, writ granted); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1989, writ denied); Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1986, no writ); Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Booker, 5 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1928, no writ), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 852 (1929).
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able contract of employment. Normally, the employer will counter this
argument by alleging that the agreement violates the statute of frauds, which
provides that an oral agreement which will not be performed within one year
from the date of its making is unenforceable. 52 The duration of the oral
agreement determines whether the statute of frauds renders the agreement
invalid.5 3 When no period of performance is stated in an oral employment
contract, the general rule in Texas is that the statute of frauds does not apply
because the contract is performable within a year. 54 If an oral agreement
can cease upon some contingency, other than by some fortuitous event or the
death of one of the parties, the agreement may be performed within one year,
and the statute of frauds does not apply.5 5 Generally, the statute of frauds
nullifies only contracts that must last longer than one year. 56
The success of the employee's claim depends largely on the nature of the
employer's assurance. 57 For example, an oral agreement for employment
until normal retirement age is unenforceable because the agreement must
last longer than one year, unless the promisee is within one year of normal
retirement age at the time the promise is made. 58 The courts are split on the
applicability of the statute of frauds to an oral promise of lifetime employ-
ment. Some cases hold that the promise of lifetime employment must be in
writing,59 while other cases conclude that such a promise does not need to be
in writing because the employee could conceivably die within one year of the
52. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 26.01(a)(6) (Vernon 1987); see Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
53. Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 463 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Morgan v. Jack
Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827).
54. Id. Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974); Bratcher v. Dozier,
162 Tex. 319, 321-22, 346 S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (1961); Wright v. Donaubauer, 137 Tex. 473,
477, 154 S.W.2d 637, 639 (1941); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827;
Kelley v. Apache Prods., Inc., 709 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Robertson v. Pohorelsky, 583 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Mercer v. C. A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978) (interpreting
Texas law).
55. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 463-64 (citing McRae v. Lindale Indep. School Dist., 450 S.W.2d
118, 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Fruth v. Gaston, 187 S.W.2d 581, 584
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.)).
56. Niday v. Niday, 643 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982); Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners,
Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied); Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464.
57. Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d at 827 (citing Niday, 643 S.W.2d at
920).
58. Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 489 (Tex. 1991); Stiver v. Texas
Instruments, Inc., 750 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ);
Benoit v. Polysar Gulf Coast, Inc., 728 S.W.2d 403, 407 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1987, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hurt v. Standard Oil Co., 444 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1969, no writ); Crenshaw v. General Dynamics Corp., 940 F.2d 125, 128 (5th
Cir. 1991); Green v. Texas Eastern Prods. Pipeline Co., No. H-89-1005, slip op. at 6-7 (S.D.
Tex. Jan. 30, 1991).
59. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342-43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1992, writ denied); Benoit, 728 S.W.2d at 407; Webber v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 720 S.W.2d 124,
128 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Zimmerman v. H. E. Butt Gro-
cery Co., 932 F.2d 469, 472-73 & n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 591 (1991); Pruitt v.
Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 464 (5th Cir. 1991); Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp., No.
89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not designated for publication).
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oral promise. 60 The courts are also split on the applicability of the statute of
frauds to an oral promise of continued employment for as long as the prom-
isee performs his work satisfactorily. 61 Some cases hold that such a promise
must be in writing, 62 while other cases conclude that a writing is not re-
quired because the termination of employment could occur within a year of
the oral promise. 63 The law in this area is unclear in Texas and in the Fifth
Circuit. Hopefully, the Texas Supreme Court will resolve the confusion in
the near future.
In Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla,64 the Corpus Christi court of
appeals avoided the opportunity to address the conflict in Texas cases as to
whether an oral contract of employment for as long as an employee performs
satisfactorily violates the statute of frauds. In Portilla, Hortencia Portilla
worked for Goodyear for twenty-two years. For seventeen years, Portilla
was supervised by her brother even though the arrangement violated the
company's anti-nepotism policy. Goodyear took no action to enforce the
policy until 1987 when Goodyear informed Portilla that she and her brother
were violating the policy. Goodyear asked Portilla to transfer to Houston.
Due to family responsibilities, Portilla could not transfer to Houston. Por-
tilla alleged that she was discharged as a result of her refusal to transfer.
Portilla sued Goodyear for wrongful discharge alleging an oral agreement
with Goodyear that she would have a job as long as she was doing a good job
such that she could not be terminated at will. The jury found for Portilla
and Goodyear appealed. The court of appeals affirmed.65 The court held
that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Goodyear
represented to Portilla that she would have her job as long as she did a good
job. 66 The court also found that the oral agreement did not violate the stat-
60. Chevalier v. Lane's, Inc., 147 Tex. 106, 110-11, 213 S.W.2d 530, 532 (1948); Central
Nat'l Bank v. Cox, 96 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1936, no writ); see also Gil-
liam v. Kouchoucos, 161 Tex. 299, 301, 340 S.W.2d 27, 27-28 (1960) (oral contract of employ-
ment for 10 years not excluded from statute of frauds by provision that it would terminate
upon death of employee).
61. Pruitt, 932 F.2d at 464-65 (applying Texas law and recognizing split of authority).
62. Id. at 464-66 (Fifth Circuit held that it was bound to follow Falconer even though the
court recognized that Falconer is contrary to Texas law); Falconer v. Soltex Polymer Corp.,
No. 89-2216, slip op. at 8-9 (5th Cir. Sept. 12, 1989) (not published) (oral agreement of em-
ployment for as long as the employee "obeyed the company rules and did his job" barred by
the statute of frauds); Rodriguez v. Benson Properties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 277 (W.D. Tex.
1989) (interpreting Texas law) (oral agreement of employment so long as employee performed
satisfactorily violates statute of fraud); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward, 829 S.W.2d 340, 342-
43 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) (oral promise of job for "as long as I wanted it
and made a good hand" barred by statute of limitations).
63. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 836 S.W.2d 664, 669-70 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted); McRae v. Lindale Indep. Sch. Dist., 450 S.W.2d 118, 124
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167,
168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1952, no writ); see also Johnson v. Ford Motor Co., 690
S.W.2d 90, 91-93 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, writ refd n.r.e.) (plaintiff stated cause of action
for breach of express employment contract by alleging that his at-will status was modified by
oral agreements with supervisory personnel that he would not be terminated except for good
cause and that his employment would continue so long as his work was satisfactory).
64. 836 S.W.2d 664 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ granted).
65. Id. at 672.
66. Id. at 667.
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ute of frauds. The court held that when the agreement does not specify how
long it will last, so as to be indefinite, the term of employment is not pre-
sumed to be longer than one year; therefore, the statute of frauds does not
apply.67 The court further added that simply because Portilla requested
damages for a period greater than one year does not bring her claim for
breach of an oral contract within the statute of frauds.68 The Texas
Supreme Court granted Goodyear's writ of error on its points of error that
the court of appeals opinion creates an unrecognized exception to the em-
ployment-at-will rule and that there was no evidence that Goodyear agreed
that it would not discharge Portilla except for good cause. 69
3. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no general duty in
Texas not to negligently inflict emotional distress.70 In Boyles v. Kerr, Dan
Boyles, with the help of three male friends, covertly videotaped Susan Kerr
having sexual intercourse with him. Boyles then showed the videotape to
ten friends on three occasions. Additionally, gossip about the tape spread
quickly among Kerr and Boyles' friends in Houston and at their respective
colleges. Kerr sued Boyles and his three friends for negligent (but not inten-
tional) infliction of emotional distress.71 Kerr alleged that she suffered hu-
miliation and severe emotional distress from the videotape and the
subsequent gossip. The jury awarded Kerr actual and exemplary damages
for her claim and the court of appeals affirmed.72 On appeal the supreme
court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial in the interest of jus-
tice.73 Overruling St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard74 the court held that
there is no independent right to recover for negligently inflicted emotional
distress.75 The court stated that where emotional distress is a recognized
element of damages for breach of a recognized legal duty, a plaintiff may
recover damages for emotional distress without showing a physical manifes-
tation of the emotional distress.76 Accordingly, to the extent employees sue
for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of their
67. Id. at 669-70 (citing Miller v. Riata Cadillac Co., 517 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1974);
Morgan v. Jack Brown Cleaners, Inc., 764 S.W.2d 825, 826-27 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ
dism'd); McRae v. Lindale Indep. Sch. Dist., 450 S.W.2d 118, 123-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hardison v. A. H. Belo Corp., 247 S.W.2d 167, 168-69 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1952, no writ)).
68. Id. at 670-71.
69. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Portilla, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 489, 490 (Jan. 27,
1993).
70. Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231, 236-37 (Dec. 2, 1992).
71. Kerr dropped all of her claims for intentional and negligent invasion of privacy before
the case was submitted to the jury.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 238.
74. 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987), overruled by Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231
(Dec. 2, 1992). The court observed that the judgment for the Garrards was supportable on the
right to recover for emotional distress damages arising from the mishandling of a corpse.
Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 232 n.3.




employment or termination of employment, such a claim is clearly barred by
Boyles v. Kerr.77
4. Intentional Infliction Of Severe Emotional Distress
In Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Mendez78 and
Boyles v. Kerr,79 the Texas Supreme Court left open the issue whether the
court will recognize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.80
In Diamond Shamrock, the employee, Roque Mendez, was discharged for
stealing a box of nails. Mendez complained at trial that the reason for his
termination was untrue and that the community in which he lived heard
about the reason for his termination. As a result, Mendez sued for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress based not on his termination, but be-
cause he was falsely depicted in the community as a thief. The trial court
rendered a judgment based upon the jury's award of damages to Mendez for
his claim, but the court of appeals reversed.8 1 The supreme court affirmed
the court of appeals and held that even if Mendez' charges were accepted as
true, the company's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous to raise a fact
issue.8 2 The court reiterated that Mendez had the burden to establish the
level of "outrageousness" defined in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
77. See Brunnemann v. Terra Int'l, Inc., 975 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th Cir. 1992) (no cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of termination of employment);
Conaway v. Control Data Corp., 955 F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 186 (1992); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986)
(same); Clayton v. Nabisco Brands, Inc., 804 F. Supp. 882, 886 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (same); Aus-
tin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *6 (S.D. Tex.
Jan. 2, 1992) (same); Soto v. City of Laredo, 764 F. Supp. 454, 457 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (same);
Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301-02 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (same);
Sauls v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 750 F. Supp. 783, 790 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (same); Nichols v.
Columbia Gas Dev., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 1990) (same); Williams v. Sealed Power
Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL 102799, at *3 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (same); Fiorenza v. First
City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988). See generally McAlister v.
Medina Elec. Co-op., Inc., 830 S.W.2d 659, 662-63 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ de-
nied) (discharged employee's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress preempted by
Workers' Compensation Act).
78. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992)
79. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231 (Dec. 2, 1992).
80. In both cases the supreme court disposed of the issue on other grounds and concluded
that it did not need to reach the issue whether the cause of action will be expressly recognized
in Texas. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 198; Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 236
n.10. To establish a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, the plaintiff
must show that (1) the defendants acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the conduct was ex-
treme and outrageous; (3) the conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; and (4)
that the emotional distress was severe. Tidelands Auto. Club, Inc. v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939,
942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. The court of appeals held that there was no evidence that Diamond Shamrock acted
intentionally or recklessly. Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Mendez, 809
S.W.2d 514, 521 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 844 S.W.2d 198
(Tex. 1992). Importantly, the court recognized that a certain degree of emotional distress will
naturally accompany losing a job, and that the termination of an at-will employee is a permis-
sible exercise of a legal right and will not support an action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. Id. at 522 (citing Novosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 495 F. Supp. 344, 347
(E.D. Mich. 1980) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. g (1965)).
82. 844 S.W.2d at 202 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
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TORTS. 8 3 The court observed that there may be situations where termina-
tion is accompanied by outrageous conduct. However, the employment-at-
will doctrine would be eviscerated if an employer's public statement of the
reason for the termination was evidence to support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress any time the employee disputed the reason.84
In a case that is pending before the Texas Supreme Court, Casas v.
Wornick Co. ,85 the court granted writ to determine whether there was a fact
issue that the employer's conduct in terminating the employee was extreme
and outrageous so as to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress
as a matter of law.8 6 Casas, which is an ordinary discharge case,8 7 presents
the supreme court with the issue of whether a termination alone may be
sufficient to state a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional dis-
tress. With the supreme court's denial of the writ on Horton v. Montgomery
Ward & Co.,88 the supreme court will most likely recognize the tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, but require that a plaintiff meet the
level of outrageousness as defined in the section 46, comment d, of the RE-
STATEMENT. Such a position would be consistent with the court's recent
decisions in Diamond Shamrock and Boyles v. Kerr89 and with the federal
83. The court noted that conduct reaching the level of outrageousness necessary for liabil-
ity for intentional infliction of emotional distress is defined as follows:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in char-
acter, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)). See also Boyles v. Kerr,
36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231, 236 (Dec. 2, 1992) (plaintiff must establish outrageous conduct as an
element of the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
84. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 202.
85. 818 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ granted).
86. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 879, 879 (June 17, 1992) (point of error I).
87. For a discussion of the facts in Casas, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Em-
ployment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1749-50 (1992).
88. 827 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied) (court of appeals
adopted RESTATEMENT § 46 cmts. d and h for determining when conduct reaches the neces-
sary level of outrageousness). The court added that liability for outrageous conduct exists
only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case
in which outrageous conduct is found is one in which the recitation of the facts
to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!"
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT § 46 cmt. d). The court added that liability does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppression, or other triviali-
ties.... [T]he rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing
down, and in the meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required
to be hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional acts
that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind. There is no occasion for the law to
intervene in every case where someone's feelings are hurt. There must still be
freedom to express an unflattering opinion, and some safety valve must be left
through which irascible tempers may blow off relatively harmless steam.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT § 46 cmt. d). See also McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 757
S.W.2d 816, 820 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 779 S.W.2d
69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), aff'd on remand, 807 S.W.2d 577
(Tex. 1991) (employer's conduct not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law).
89. See supra note 70, and accompanying text.
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cases interpreting Texas law.90 Whether the conduct is extreme and outra-
geous as to allow recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress is a
question of law for the court.9'
One Texas case that no longer appears viable in light of the supreme
court's recent decisions is Havens v. Tomball Community Hospital.92 Havens
was the first case in Texas which addressed the issue of intentional infliction
of emotional distress arising out of the employer-employee relationship. In
Havens, the plaintiff alleged that she suffered severe emotional distress when
her employer "commenced a course of conduct to harass, humiliate, and
degrade her good name, eventually leading to her willful, malicious, and un-
lawful termination. ' 93 The court found that these allegations were sufficient
90. Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law; recognizing that the Texas Supreme Court has not recognized tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Corp., 885 F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying Texas law); Mayon v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 805 F.2d 1250, 1253 n.3 (5th Cir.
1986) (mere wrongful discharge will not support a claim for emotional distress damages); Lu-
cas v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2175 (S.D. Tex. May 9, 1991) ("An employer who
does no more than exercise its right to terminate an employee has not committed outrageous
conduct in the degree and character required for liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress .... Plaintiff's discharge alone may not form the basis of a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress."); Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL
138322, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991) (holding termination alone is insufficient to support a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The discharge must be accompanied by
an extreme or outrageous act. In Young, the plaintiff alleged that following his discharge he
experienced continuing emotional distress. He made no allegations of any outrageous act
which occurred during the termination process.); Davis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. H-89-2806
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 1991) (termination alone will not support a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress); Green v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., No. 89-1005 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
1991) (finding termination alone not enough; the discharge must be accompanied by some
extreme or outrageous act); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301(S.D. Tex. 1990) (finding termination alone insufficient; the discharge must be accompanied by
some extreme or outrageous conduct); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839 (S.D. Tex. Nov.
20, 1990) (determining the mere act of wrongful discharge cannot form the basis for a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Nichols v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418(S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (because plaintiff was told of her discharge in private, and she
alleged only vague, general references to offensive comments, identifying only one specific
comment from her supervisor, plaintiff failed to establish her intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim); Ismail v. Wendy's Int'l, Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1990) (dismissing
plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress because the complaint merely
stated an ordinary employment dispute); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 676, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1992) (determining that an employer who
does no more than exercise its right to terminate an employee has not committed outrageous
conduct in the degree and character required for liability for intentional infliction of emotional
harm); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain, 756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Tex. 1989) (finding no
evidence of extreme or outrageous conduct or that plaintiff's distress was severe); Yarbrough v.
La Petite Academy, No. H-87-3967 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989) (determining that termination of
an employment relationship generally cannot give rise to a claim for emotional distress.); Fi-
orenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D. Tex. 1988) (noting that
Texas law does not recognize claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress arising out of
termination of employment); Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938, 941(W.D. Tex. 1988) (finding that single act of discharge will not support a claim for intentional
infliction of emotional distress).
91. Horton v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 827 S.W.2d 361, 369 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1992, writ denied) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment h (1965)).
92. 793 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
93. Id. at 691.
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to be submitted to a jury.94 While the court found it significant that the
plaintiff's allegation of intentional infliction of emotional distress was based
on willful and malicious treatment and rumors circulated before her dis-
charge, 95 the conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law.
96
The conduct in Havens, similar to the conduct in Diamond Shamrock, but
not as egregious as alleged in Diamond Shamrock, was not sufficiently ex-
treme and outrageous to create a fact issue to support Haven's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Havens should be overruled as an
incorrect interpretation of Texas law.
To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
federal district courts97 and the Fifth Circuit9" consistently require plaintiffs
to establish a level of conduct that is extreme and outrageous as that term is
defined in the RESTATEMENT. In Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso,
Inc.,99 the Fifth Circuit set aside a jury finding of intentional infliction of
emotional distress under Texas law. 100 The plaintiff, Ramirez, had been em-
ployed for approximately 28 years, had received several promotions, had be-
come a general manager of Allright's El Paso operations in 1986, and had
reported directly to the president of Allright's El Paso operations. Two
years later, a new president of the El Paso operations was selected. The new
president was only 27 years old. Ramirez was fired not long afterwards
without warnings or reprimands in his personnel file, and only two months
after receiving a pay raise. Subsequent negotiations led to Ramirez being
rehired in a supervisory capacity at his previous salary. After reinstatement,
94. Id. at 692.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Garcia v. Webb, 764 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Lucas v. Columbia Gas Dev.
Corp., No. 89-2175 (S.D. Tex. May 9,1991); Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991
WL 138322, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5, 1991); Davis v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., No. H-89-2806 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 28, 1991); Green v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., No. 89-1005 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
1991); Hoose v. T.I.R.R., No. H-90-2153 (S.D. Tex. June 10, 1991); Taylor v. Houston Light-
ing and Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 301 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Koehler v. Houston Lighting and
Power Co., No. H-89-909 (S.D. Tex. 1990); Perez v. Airco Carbon Group, Inc., No. C-88-13,
1990 WL 128231, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 1990); Castillo v. Horton Automatics, No. C-88-
199 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 1990); Williams v. Sealed Power Corp., No. 4-88-254-E, 1990 WL
102797, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 1990); Benavides v. Woodforest Nat'l Bank, No. H-87-3094
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 1989); In re Continental Airlines, Corp., 64 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 1986); Scott v. Vetco Gray, Inc., No. 89-1839, slip op. at 4 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 20, 1990);
Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 756 F. Supp. 994, 1002 (W.D. Tex. 1990); Nichols v.
Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990); Ismail v. Wendy's Int'l,
Inc., No. 90-1817 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 1990); Austin v. Champion Int'l Corp., No. H-87-1845,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6761, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 1992); Starrett v. Iberia Airlines of Spain,
756 F. Supp. 292, 296 (S.D. Tex. 1989); Yarbrough v. La Petite Academy, No. H-87-3967
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 1989); Fiorenza v. First City Bank-Central, 710 F. Supp. 1104, 1105 (E.D.
Tex. 1988); Laird v. Texas Commerce Bank-Odessa, 707 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Tex. 1988);
Abston v. Levi Strauss & Co., 684 F. Supp. 152, 157 (E.D. Tex. 1987).
98. See Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 965 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1992);
Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1375 (5th Cir. 1992); Guthrie v.
Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1267 (1992); Wilson v.
Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1143 (5th Cir. 1991); Dean v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 885
F.2d 300, 306 (5th Cir. 1989).
99. 970 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1992).
100. Id. at 1373.
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however, Ramirez lost his seniority. Also, his salary was less than agreed,
and Ramirez was soon demoted to duty as a parking lot attendant, where he
was required to work longer hours than the other attendants and to work
more weekends than the other supervisors. About nine months after his re-
instatement, Ramirez was switched to an hourly wage and required to punch
a time clock, which he refused to do, resulting in his termination.
The Fifth Circuit held that while Allright's conduct was perhaps illegal
and discriminatory, the actions were "insufficient to support a finding of ex-
treme and outrageous conduct."'' 1 Unlike the facts in Wilson v. Monarch
Paper Co., 10 2 the duties that Allright required Ramirez to perform were not
menial or demeaning, but were duties that Allright required all of its other
supervisors to do on occasion and were duties that Allright had often re-
quired Ramirez himself to do before his demotion. a0 3 Thus, Ramirez was
unable to show conduct by his employer of the outrageous and reprehensible
nature that was shown in Wilson.
In the present case, Allright is not guilty of that type of reprehensible
conduct, which the court classified as passing the "bounds of conduct
that will be tolerated by civilized society . . . ." Dean [v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 885 F.2d] at 307. Simply put, the actions of Allright do not
rise to the level of extreme and outrageous behavior that Texas law and
our prior interpretations of Texas law in Wilson and Dean required to
support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 04
Accordingly, the district court's judgment was reversed. 10 5
Similarly, in Johnson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,10 6 Walter
Johnson was a sales representative for Merrell Dow in 1976 and was dis-
charged two years later. Johnson's claims were based on an alleged course
of harassing conduct against him by his supervisors that culminated in his
termination. Johnson alleged that Gena Reed, his division manager, was
extremely hostile to him, constantly criticized him and threatened him with
termination on numerous occasions. Johnson complained that Reed placed
him on indefinite probation without telling him how he could rectify his
employment status, realigned his sales territory four or five times in a year,
assigning him less productive and less lucrative areas, criticized his ability to
get his territories organized, removed a $30,000 sale from Johnson's credits,
criticized his record keeping, and refused to listen to his explanations for low
sales call reports. After Reed, Johnson worked for a series of division man-
agers, all of whom threatened to fire Johnson for various employment
problems. One division manager threatened to fire Johnson for maintaining
101. Id. at 1376.
102. 939 F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Texas law). For a discussion of Wilson,
see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1747-49 (1992).
103. 970 F.2d at 1376.
104. Id. at 1377 (emphasis added). For a discussion of Dean, see Philip J. Pfeiffer & W.
Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 81, 103-
05 (1990).
105. Id.
106. 965 F.2d 31 (5th Cir. 1992).
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a friendship with another ex-employee on whose behalf Johnson agreed to
testify against the company.
Eventually, Johnson began to suffer psychiatric problems and was placed
on disability leave. On a weekly basis, one division manager called Johnson
and asked him if he was still sick and told him that his disability was hurting
the company. While still on disability leave, Johnson was called and asked to
come to a meeting to discuss his future with the company. When he arrived,
Johnson was promptly discharged and given a counseling packet. When
Johnson asked how he would continue his treatment, he was told that he was
no longer covered under the company's insurance. Johnson was also re-
quired to return his keys to his company car. Johnson also alleged that
someone with Merrell Dow told his current employer that Johnson had been
under psychiatric care.
Johnson sued Merrell Dow for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress. Merrell Dow moved for summary judgment which was granted by
the district court.10 7 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 1 08 The court observed that,
in the employment context, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, has re-
peatedly stated that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress
will not lie for mere "employment disputes."' 09 The court held that most of
the acts complained of by Johnson "fall within the realm of an ordinary
employment dispute."' " 0 Significantly, the court stated: "In order to prop-
erly manage its business, an employer must be able to supervise, review, crit-
icize, demote, transfer and discipline employees. Not all of these processes
are pleasant for the employee. Neither is termination."' I IThe court con-
cluded that Merrell Dow's conduct did not constitute extreme and outra-
geous conduct as a matter of law. 1 2
5. Defamation and Employment Decisions
Defamation under Texas law is a defamatory statement orally communi-
cated or published without legal excuse.' 13 Under Texas law, the court must
make the threshold determination of whether the complained of statement
or publication is capable of conveying a defamatory meaning. 114 In making
107. Id. at 32.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 33.
110. Id. at 34 (quoting Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d at 1145).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ); Crum v. American Airlines, Inc., 946 F.2d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Texas
law). A defamatory statement is defined in TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 73.001
(Vernon 1986), as a statement
that tends to blacken the memory of the dead or that tends to injure a living
person's reputation and thereby expose the person to public hatred, contempt or
ridicule, or financial injury or to impeach any person's honesty, integrity, virtue,
or reputation or to publish the natural defects of anyone and thereby expose the
person to public hatred, ridicule, or financial injury.
114. Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989); Musser v. Smith Protective Serv.,
Inc., 723 S.W.2d 653, 654 (Tex. 1987); Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d
377, 381 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1989, no writ).
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this determination, the court construes the statement as a whole, in light of
the surrounding circumstances, considering how a person of ordinary intelli-
gence would understand the statement.' 15 Only when the court determines
the language is ambiguous or of doubtful import should a jury determine the
statement's meaning and the effect of the statement on an ordinary reader. 16
a. The Doctrine of Self-Publication
Generally, in the employment context, publication of defamation occurs
when an employer communicates to a third party a defamatory statement
about a former employee. The doctrine of self-publication provides that
publication also occurs when an individual is compelled to publish defama-
tory statements in response to inquiries of prospective employers, and the
former employer should have foreseen that compulsion. 17 Unlike other ju-
risdictions, Texas does not analyze the circumstances in terms of whether
the facts compelled the former employee to repeat the defamatory words;" t8
Texas courts focus instead on the foreseeability that the words will be com-
115. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Fitzjarrald v. Panhandle Pub-
lishing Co., 149 Tex. 87, 96, 228 S.W.2d 499, 504 (1950). See Crum v. American Airlines,
Inc., 946 F.2d at 428 (announcement to staff that employee on leave pending results of an
investigation by an industrial psychologist/management consultant, whose job was to examine
the organization at the airline's magazine, cannot be construed as an allegation of mental
disturbance).
116. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 570; Musser, 723 S.W.2d at 655; Denton Publishing Co. v. Boyd,
460 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1970). Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985), illustrates how
a statement that may not appear defamatory may be construed as defamatory by a jury. In
Buck, a prospective new employer of Buck telephoned Hall & Co. to learn about the circum-
stances surrounding Buck's termination. One of Hall & Co.'s employees stated that Buck had
not reached his production goals. When pressed for more information, the employee declined
to comment. The prospective employer then asked if the company would rehire Buck, and the
employee answered no. The prospective employer testified that because of the company's em-
ployee's comments, he was unwilling to extend an offer of employment to Buck. Buck sued his
former employer for defamation of character alleging that Hall & Co. employees made defam-
atory statements about him during the course of telephone references with Buck's prospective
employers. The jury found in favor of Buck. The company appealed the jury determination
that the alleged statements were defamatory and argued that the words were susceptible to a
nondefamatory interpretation because Buck was never explicitly accused of any wrongdoing
nor was he called anything disparaging. The court disagreed and concluded that there was
evidence sufficient to show that the prospective employer understood the statements made by
the defendant's employee in a defamatory sense. Because the statements were ambiguous, the
court held that the jury was entitled to find that the company's statements were calculated to
convey that Buck had been terminated because of serious misconduct. Id. at 619.
117. See Diane H. Mazur, Note, Self-Publication of Defamation and Employee Discharge, 6
REV. LITIG. 313, 314 (1987). Two cases in Texas recognize the doctrine of self-publication.
See Chasewood Constr. Co. v. Rico, 696 S.W.2d 439, 445 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was reasonable to expect that contractor dismissed from project for
theft would be required to repeat reason to others); First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake,
606 S.W.2d 696, 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court held it was
reasonable to expect that former bank employee discharged for dishonesty would be required
to admit in employment interview or in application for employment about same).
118. See McKinney v. Santa Clara County, 110 Cal. App. 3d 787, 793, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89,
94 (1980); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1343 (Colo. 1988); Belcher v. Little,
315 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876,
895 (Minn. 1986) (the following must be proven for a finding that a statement is self-com-
pelled: (1) a strong compulsion to disclose the defamatory statement to third parties exists; (2)
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municated to a third party.' 1 9
b. Absolute Privilege
Any communication, oral or written, which is uttered or published in the
course of or in contemplation of a judicial proceeding is absolutely privi-
leged. 120 No action for damages will lie for such communication even
though it is false and published with malice. 12 ' The privilege has also been
extended to proceedings before executive officers, boards, and commissions
exercising quasi-judicial powers. 122 Examples of quasi-judicial bodies in-
clude the State Bar Grievance Committee, a grand jury, the Railroad Com-
mission, the Pharmacy Board, the Internal Affairs Division of the Police
Department of Dallas,' 2 3 and the Texas Employment Commission.'
24
A communication by an employer about a former employee may also be
absolutely privileged if the employee authorized the communication. In
Smith v. Holley, 12 5 Jeannette Holley was hired by the Big Spring Police De-
partment as a probationary employee. After completing the police academy
program, Smith began field training with experienced officers. The first of-
ficer gave her favorable evaluations, but the second and third officer did not
give her good evaluations, and Lonnie Smith notified Holley that she was
terminated. Holley and the city manager agreed that the city would rein-
state Holley, that she would resign for personal reasons, that the city would
purge from its personnel records all references to involuntary termination
and would mark each page of her personnel file with a notice limiting infor-
mation to be given to anyone inquiring about Holley's employment.126 Sub-
sequently, Holley applied for a job with the United States Marshals Service
the existence of the strong compulsion was reasonably foreseeable to the wrongdoer; and (3)
such disclosure was actually made).
119. Chasewood, 696 S.W.2d at 445-46; Ake, 606 S.W.2d at 701. The Texas courts' recog-
nition of the doctrine of self-publication is based upon comment k of the RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977). Comment k provides:
k. Intentional or negligent publication. There is an intent to publish defama-
tory matter when the actor does an act for the purpose of communicating it to a
third person or with knowledge that it is substantially certain to be so
communicated....
It is not necessary, however, that the communication to a third person be inten-
tional. If a reasonable person would recognize that an act creates an unreasona-
ble risk that the defamatory matter will be communicated to a third person, the
conduct becomes a negligent communication. A negligent communication
amounts to a publication just as effectively as an intentional communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. k (1977).
120. See James v. Brown, 637 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex. 1982).
121. See Reagan v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 140 Tex. 105, 110, 166 S.W.2d 909, 912 (1942).
122. Id. at 111, 166 S.W.2d at 912.
123. See Putter v. Anderson, 601 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
124. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522lb-9(j) (Vernon 1987). Krenek v. Abel, 594
S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1980, no writ); Taylor v. Houston Lighting and
Power Co., 756 F. Supp. 297, 303 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
125. 827 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
126. The notice read:
NOTICE
TO BE PLACED IN THE TOP OF EACH CITY
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(USMS) and signed a form authorizing persons contacted to give out infor-
mation about job applicants.' 27 A USMS investigator contacted the Big
Spring Police Department as part of a routine civil service background
check. Smith, who was then acting Chief of Police, received a copy of the
authorization, told the USMS investigator about his experience with Holley
and provided documents to the investigator. Another officer talked with the
investigator as well. Holley was subsequently informed by letter that she
would not be hired and that the reason was based upon the information
learned from Smith.
Holley sued Smith and others for defamation per se. The jury awarded
Holley $500,000 in actual damages and $500,000 in punitive damages
against Smith, but Holley's claims against the other defendants were re-
solved in their favor. The trial court disregarded the punitive damages
award. Smith and Holley appealed. The court of appeals reversed and ren-
dered that Holley take nothing on her claim against Smith.
The court first observed the rule that a qualified privilege' 28 protects a
OF BIG SPRING FILE RELATING TO
JEANNETTE (JANET) HOLLEY
Anyone inquiring about the employment history of Jeannette (Janet) Holley
with the City of Big Spring shall only be informed as follows:
1. Mrs. Holley began working for the Big Spring Police Department on June 1,
1984 as a police officer trainee.
2. Mrs. Holley resigned for personal reasons on November 21, 1984.
3. City policy prohibits any additional information about prior employees
from being released.
ABSOLUTELY NOTHING BUT THE ABOVE INFORMATION WILL
BE RELEASED TO ANYONE BY ANYBODY.
The agreement also included this provision:
In the event of any inquiry from any prospective employer... only [these] three
points ... will be read or given out. This information will be the only informa-
tion given out regarding her termination as a police officer, either officially or
unofficially by anyone connected with the City of Big Spring.
Id. at 435 n. 1.
127. The authorization read:
AUTHORIZATION FOR RELEASE
OF INFORMATION
I hereby authorize any Investigator or duly accredited representative of the
United States Civil Service Commission bearing this release ... to obtain any
information from schools, residential management agents, employers, criminal
justice agencies, or individuals, relating to my activities. This information may
include, but is not limited to, academic, residential, achievement, performance,
attendance, personal history, disciplinary, arrest, and conviction records. I
hereby direct you to release such information upon request of the bearer. I un-
derstand that the information released is for official use by the Commission and
may be disclosed to such third parties as necessary in the fulfillment of official
responsibilities.
I hereby release any individual, including record custodians, from any and all
liability for damages of whatever kind or nature which may at any time result to
me on account of compliance, or any attempts to comply, with this
authorization.
Id. at 435.
128. A qualified privilege protects communications made in good faith on subject matter in
which the author has a common interest with the other person, or with reference to which he
has a duty to communicate to the other person. Id. at 436 (citing Houston v. Grocers Supply
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former employer's statements to a prospective employer about a former em-
ployee.129 The court, however, did not have to address the qualified privi-
lege issue because the authorization signed by Holley created an absolute
privilege.1 30 Holley argued that (1) public policy would be violated by en-
forcing a release of an intentional tort; (2) the authorization did not encom-
pass the information given by Smith; and (3) Smith was not protected by the
authorization because it did not specifically name him. The court disagreed
with each of Holley's arguments.
First, the court held that one can consent to defamation and that a docu-
ment that consents to an intentional tort is per se against public policy.13'
Citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, the court held that when a
plaintiff consents to a publication, the defendant is absolutely privileged to
make it even if it proves to be defamatory. 132 The court added that Texas
follows the general rule that if a plaintiff complains about a publication that
he consented to, authorized, invited or procured, the plaintiff cannot recover
for injuries sustained as a result of the publication. 133 The court observed
that the general rule also applies to claims for defamation.1 34 In other
words, the consent privilege applies when a plaintiff gives references for a
prospective employer to contact and the former employer makes defamatory
statements. 35 While the court observed that there is some uncertainty
whether consent creates an absolute privilege or simply makes the defama-
tion not actionable, the distinction is irrelevant because the result is the
same. 136 The court also noted that consent creates an absolute privilege that
is not effected by a finding that the former employer acted with malice. 137
Co., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Moore & Assoc. v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 604 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ); W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 115 at 828-30 (5th ed.
1984)). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1733-34 (1992) (discussing qualified privilege).
129. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d at 436 (citing Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458
S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ dism'd); Duncantell v. Universal Life
Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); 2
Fowler v. Harper et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.26 at 228 (2d ed. 1986)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977)).
133. Id. at 437 (citing Lyle v. Waddle, 144 Tex. 90, 188 S.W.2d 770, 772 (1945)). See Jones
v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 979 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law, court
held plaintiff waived state law libel claim based on a defendant's publication of a memorandum
to the school district where plaintiff released the defendants from liability for information they
provided to the district).
134. Id. (citing Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Mayfield v. Gleichert, 437 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); Wilks v. DeBolt, 211 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1948, no writ)).
135. Id. (citing 2 Harper supra note 130, § 5.17 at 138-39 (2d ed. 1986)).
136. Id. at 437-38. The court noted that the RESTATEMENT and other treatises conclude
that consent creates an absolute privilege. Id. at 437 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 583; KEETON ET AL., supra note 128, 114; Harper, supra note 129, § 5.17). The
Texas cases seem to suggest that consent simply makes the defamation not actionable. Id. at
438 (citing Lyle, 188 S.W.2d at 772; Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937; Mayfield, 437 S.W.2d at
642; Wilks, 211 S.W.2d at 590).
137. Id. at 438-39 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. f (1977)).
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Second, the court analyzed the scope and extent of Holley's consent. The
court noted that consent does not necessarily give a former employer carte
blanche to tell anyone anything he knows about the plaintiff for an unlimited
duration unless that is a reasonable interpretation of the consent. Therefore,
the scope of the consent may not exceed what is reasonable in light of the
language of the consent or the circumstances that created the consent.138
The court held that the authorization is worded broadly; it does not limit
disclosure to true or favorable information; 139 it does not reserve Holley's
right to sue providers of information that Holley disagrees with; it autho-
rizes contact with a large and diverse group of people; it contemplates a wide
and probing inquiry into all aspects of Holley's background; and, finally, it
releases every kind of claim imaginable.'40 The court concluded that Smith
did not exceed the scope of the authorization; he responded promptly, he
spoke only of Holley's job performance; and he provided the information to
the investigator only.141 The court also held that while consent does not
protect defamations that the plaintiff had no reason to anticipate, 42 Holley
could take no comfort in this limitation because she was fully aware that
Smith and others held unfavorable opinions of her job performance. 43 Fur-
ther, the court found that the reach of the authorization was not effected by
the city's agreement to keep secret the real reasons for Holley's termination
because Smith was not a party to the agreement. 44 Moreover, Holley did
not only authorize prior employers to let USMS review documents in her
personnel file and other places, but she authorized personal contact with
individuals and authorized the release of information.145
Finally, the court held that it was not significant that the release did not
expressly name Smith.146 The court correctly observed that to require the
naming of specific individuals would "render consent forms useless by chil-
ling the willingness of former employers to respond candidly" to the authori-
zation. 147 The court also noted that there was no way that the authorization
concerning future conduct could name unknown persons that a prospective
employer might interview.148
"When the privilege is absolute, the actor's motivation is irrelevant." Id. at 439 (quoting
Huriburt v. Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 749 S.W.2d 762, 768 (Tex. 1987)).
138. Id. at 439 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1977)).
139. The court noted that authorizing only the release of favorable information in response
to authorizations for background checks is completely worthless. Id. at 440.
140. Id. at 439.
141. Id. at 439.
142. Id. at 440 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1977)).
143. Id. (distinguishing Frank B. Hall & Co. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1009 (1985) (no evidence that
former employee knew that former employee might defame him or that the former employee
signed a consent form) and Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1986, no writ) (consent did not bar defamation action because former employee did not know
that former employer might defame him)).
144. Id.
145. Id.





c. An Employer's Qualified Privilege
An employer will not be liable if the statement is published under circum-
stances that make it conditionally privileged and if the privilege is not
abused. 149 Whether a qualified privilege exists is a question of law. 150 "A
qualified privilege comprehends communication made in good faith on sub-
ject matter in which the author has an interest or with reference to which he
has an interest or with reference to which he has a duty to perform to an-
other person having a corresponding interest or duty."' 5 ' Generally, defam-
atory statements by an employer about an employee, or former employee, to
a person having a common interest in the matter to which the communica-
tion relates, such as a prospective employer, are qualifiedly privileged. 52
An employer may lose the qualified privilege if his communication or pub-
lication is accompanied by actual malice.' 53 In defamation cases, actual
malice is separate and distinct from traditional common law malice.' 54 Ac-
tual malice does not include ill will, spite or evil motive; rather, it requires
the making of a statement with knowledge that it is false, or with reckless
disregard of whether it is true. 155 Reckless disregard is defined as a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity, and the plaintiff must establish "suf-
ficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact enter-
tained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication."' 56 An error in
judgment is not sufficient to show actual malice. 57
While the Texas cases adopting the doctrine of self-publication do not ad-
dress the issue of whether a qualified privilege exists in self-defamation ac-
tions,' 58 decisions in other jurisdictions which recognize the doctrine of self-
publication have recognized a qualified privilege in the employment con-
149. Houston v. Grocers Supply Co., Inc., 625 S.W.2d 798, 800 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1981, no writ); Duncantell v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 446 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801,
806 (5th Cir. 1990); Gaines v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Soc'y, 681 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1982)
(citing Bergman v. Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1980, no writ); Butler v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 510, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1970, writ dism'd w.o.j.)).
150. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (interpreting Texas law); Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800
(citing Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816; Mayfield v. Gleichart, 484 S.W.2d 619,
626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1972, no writ)).
151. Boze, 912 F.2d at 806 (quoting Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800).
152. Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ)
(citing Grocers Supply, 625 S.W.2d at 800; Oshman's Sporting Goods, 594 S.W.2d at 816);
Duncantell, 446 S.W.2d at 937.
153. Dixon v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 607 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1980); Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. O'Neil, 456 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. 1970); Marathon Oil Co. v. Salazar, 682
S.W.2d 624, 630-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grocers Supply,
625 S.W.2d at 801; Bridges v. Farmer, 483 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no
writ).
154. Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 558 (Tex. 1989); see Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d at
571.
155. Carr, 776 S.W.2d at 571 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328
(1974)).
156. Id. (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968); Casso, 776 S.W.2d at
558).
157. Id.
158. See supra, notes 117-19.
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text.' 59 A federal district court in Texas recognized that such a privilege
may exist in self-defamation actions; however, the court rendered judgment
on other grounds.16°
6. False Light Theory of Invasion of Privacy
In 1973, the Texas Supreme Court recognized the right of privacy 16 1 by
stating that "an unwarranted invasion of the right of privacy constitutes a
legal injury for which a remedy will be granted."' 162 Subsequently, the
supreme court recognized the four categories of invasion of privacy identi-
fied by Dean Prosser: (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of an-
other; (2) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (3) unreasonable
publicity given to another's private life; and (4) publicity that unreasonably
places another in a false light before the public. 163
Recently, in Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing Co. v. Men-
dez,164 the Texas Supreme Court granted Diamond Shamrock's application
for a writ of error to review the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support
the jury's finding of false light invasion of privacy and to determine whether
159. See, e.g., Steinbach v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 728 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (D.
Minn. 1989) (Minnesota law recognizes a qualified privilege in the employer/employee rela-
tionship if the statements were made in good faith); Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d
1336, 1347 (Colo. 1988) (qualified privilege recognized in the employer-employee context);
Elmore v. Shell Oil Co., 733 F. Supp. 544, 546 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (recognizing existence of a
qualified privilege); Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986).
In Lewis, the Minnesota Supreme Court correctly acknowledged the reason for allowing the
qualified privilege in self-publication cases:
Where an employer would be entitled to a privilege if it had actually published
the statement, it makes little sense to deny the privilege where the identical com-
munication is made to identical third parties with the only difference being the
mode of publication. Finally, recognition of a qualified privilege seems to be the
only effective means of addressing the concern that every time an employer
states the reason for discharging an employee it will subject itself to potential
liability for defamation.
Id. at 889-90.
160. Young v. Dow Chem. Co., No. H-90-1145, 1991 WL 138322, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 5,
1991).
161. In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis propounded a concept of a right of
privacy that they asserted justified an independent tort remedy. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D.
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-98 (1890). The Warren and Bran-
deis article resulted from a Boston newspaper's regular practice of elaborating on the Warren's
social life. Bruce A. McKenna, Comment, False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA L.J.
113, 114 (1979). As McKenna observed, Warren's concern with the publication of this gossip
and his discussions with Brandeis led to the birth of the law of privacy. The overriding con-
cern of the Warren and Brandeis article was how to deal with excesses by the press. Warren &
Brandeis, supra, at 195-96.
162. Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
163. Industrial Found. of the South v. Tex. Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (citing William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L.
REV. 383, 389 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Privacy]; William L. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 117 at 809 (4th ed. 1971)). Interestingly, Dean Prosser was skeptical about the desirability of
the false light privacy action because of its potential confusion with defamation. See William
L. Prosser, THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 at 813-14 (4th Ed. 1971); Prosser, Privacy, supra at 400-
01. Nevertheless, Prosser's analysis of the four categories of invasion of privacy was subse-
quently adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977).
164. 844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992).
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the actual malice or negligence standard of care applied to the claim.' 65
However, the supreme court never addressed the legal insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict.' 66 Additionally, while the court seemed to
suggest that it was not willing to recognize the tort theory, the majority
opinion declined to decide whether it would recognize a cause of action for
the false light theory of invasion of privacy arising out of the termination of
employment. ' 6
7
In Diamond Shamrock, Roque Mendez sued Diamond Shamrock after his
termination of employment for theft, claiming that his discharge and the
ensuing publicity unreasonably placed him in a false light before the public
and defamed his reputation. 6 8 Because Mendez did not file his suit within
165. Id.
166. There is no evidence in Diamond Shamrock that the reason for Mendez's discharge
was publicized. Beyond the assumption that the workforce gossiped about Mendez' discharge,
there is no evidence of publicity. In Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361 (W.D. Ky.
1988), two employees were discharged after their polygraph examinations indicated deception.
The employees sued Pantry, Inc. for, among other things, false light invasion of privacy. Iden-
tifying the need to restrict false light claims in the employment context, the court stated:
If the act itself can give rise to a cause of action for false light, then any time an
employer discharges an employee, the employer runs the risk that the accompa-
nying stigma will result in a false-light lawsuit. That risk may be exacerbated
where the events occur in a small town, where plaintiffs may be well known and
news spreads quickly. False-light liability must be limited only to those cases in
which the employer unreasonably communicates to the public false reasons for a
dismissal, not the mere fact of dismissal. Otherwise the terminable-at-will em-
ployment doctrine is unreasonably restricted.
Id. at 1370. Accordingly, the court rejected the employees' false light claims.
The court's analysis in Stewart should apply to Diamond Shamrock. In the small town of
Three Rivers, news of the plaintiff's discharge apparently spread quickly. While the news may
have spread quickly, Diamond Shamrock cannot be held responsible for unreasonably commu-
nicating false reasons for dismissal to the public. Diamond Shamrock Refining and Marketing
Co. v. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d 514, 519 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991), rev'd on other grounds,
844 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. 1992). Similarly, in Rouly v. Enserch Corp., No. Civ. A. 85-1004, 1987
WL 8454 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1987), affid, 835 F.2d 1127 (1988), an employee who was sus-
pended from his job (which allegedly became widely known) sued his employer for false light
invasion of privacy. The employer investigated several employees for possible wrongdoing,
including the plaintiff, and some of the employees were later convicted of a crime. Although
the plaintiff was not convicted, he alleged that others concluded he was also guilty. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment for the employer and held:
To deny an employer an otherwise reasonable course of action simply because of
possible misperceptions by third parties would make no sense at all. To expose
that employer to damages under circumstances such as plaintiff claims here is
not the law.
The plaintiff has provided testimony by persons who claimed to have learned
that the plaintiff was investigated and was later fired for 'improprieties.' What is
not provided, however, is evidence of how those persons learned of the plaintiffs
situation. There is no indication that the defendants disclosed embarrassing or
private facts about the plaintiff to anyone not entitled to the information. Nor is
there evidence that the defendants gave the plaintiff publicity which placed him
in a false light in the public eye.
Id. at *8-9 Like Rouly, Diamond Shamrock should not be discouraged from investigating
what appears to be theft simply because of possible misperceptions by third parties. Also like
Rouly, there is evidence in Mendez that people knew of Mendez' discharge, but there is no
evidence of how those persons learned of Mendez' situation or the reason for his discharge.
167. Id.




the applicable statute of limitations, his defamation claim was not submitted
to the jury.169 Diamond Shamrock had experienced a series of thefts at its
refinery. A security guard discovered Mendez' lunch bag in the clock house,
containing a box of nails. Wayne Billings and John Hoffman, refinery man-
agement, subsequently called Mendez and asked him to return to the plant
to explain why the nails were in his lunch bag. 170 After Mendez explained,
Hoffman asked Mendez if he agreed with Hoffman's assessment that Men-
dez's actions constituted stealing. Mendez responded, "I guess so." Hoff-
man then discharged Mendez and left the room. 171 Billings told his
supervisors of Mendez' termination, but not the reason for the termination.
One employee stated that news of Mendez's termination was all over the
plant. While Mendez left the refinery without talking to anyone, Mendez
and his wife discussed his termination with more than 200 people in the
community. Mendez sued Diamond Shamrock for false light invasion of
privacy and prevailed. On appeal, Diamond Shamrock challenged, among
other things, the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of
false light invasion of privacy. The court of appeals affirmed the jury's ver-
dict as to the false light claim.172 The Texas Supreme Court reversed. 73
The court held that even if the cause of action was recognized, Mendez
would not be entitled to recover because he did not submit all of the essential
elements of the false light theory. 174 The court agreed with Diamond
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
privacy if,
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of
the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977); see also Rodney A. Smolla, LAW OF DEF-
AMATION § 10.021] at 10-7 (1986). The Texas courts of appeals have followed the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS when reviewing the false light theory of invasion of privacy.
Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345, 346-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ); Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222, 223-24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no
writ); see also Moore v. The Big Picture Co., 828 F.2d 270, 273 (5th Cir. 1987) (interpreting
Texas law).
169. Diamond Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 209. The statute of limitations for defamation
actions is one year, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.002 (Vernon 1986), while the
statute of limitations for false light is probably two years, Id. § 16.003.
170. Mendez then explained that his supervisor called him at the end of his shift and told
him to clean up the area, and that he was angered by the way his supervisor talked to him.
Mendez slammed down the telephone, saw where a carpenter had left some nails on the floor,
threw the nails in a box, put the box in his lunch bag, and placed his lunch bag on a shelf in the
control room. Thereafter, the plaintiff took his lunch bag out of the control room, walked to
the clock house to clock out, and left his lunch bag on a table in the clock house. Diamond
Shamrock, 844 S.W.2d at 198.
171. Billings then asked Mendez why he had not come to Billings first because he could
have used a gate pass (a company procedure to remove company property from the plant).
Mendez replied that he did not know and that he just messed up. Id.
172. Id. at 198.
173. Id.




Shamrock and held that if the tort is recognized, Mendez was required to
prove actual malice as an element of recovery. 175 Because Mendez failed to
submit the actual malice element over Diamond Shamrock's objection, the
supreme court reversed the judgment in favor of Mendez. 176 However, be-
cause the jurisdictions conflicted on the applicable standard of care (actual
malice or negligence), and because the supreme court had not yet approved
or disapproved the tort, the majority remanded the cause for a new trial in
the interest of justice, giving Mendez an opportunity to prove actual malice
and Diamond Shamrock an opportunity to object to the theory of recovery
as a valid cause of action. 177
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Gonzalez, joined by Jus-
tice Cornyn, stated that they would render judgment for Diamond Sham-
rock because remanding the case for trial on a certain legal theory was not in
the interest of justice. 178 Justice Gonzalez added that he would have
reached the important issue of whether to recognize the false light invasion
of privacy and expressly reject the tort. 179 Recognizing that the tort had
been widely criticized180 and rejected by a number of jurisdictions, 1' Justice
Gonzalez stated that he would reject the tort for two reasons: first, it dupli-
cates other rights of recovery, particularly defamation; 182 and second, it
175. Id.
176. Id. at 200.
177. Id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 180).
178. Id. at 203 (Gonzalez, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Comyn, J.) (citing
Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 455 (Tex. 1992)).
179. Id.
180. Justice Gonzalez pointed out that the false light tort is the least-recognized and most
controversial of the four types on invasion of privacy. Id. at 206 (citing BRUCE W. SANFORD,
LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 11.4.1 at 567 (2d ed. 1991) ("Of Dean Prosser's four types of privacy
torts, the false light school has generated the most criticism because of its elusive, amorphous
nature"); Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 452 (1989) ("the wiser course may be for states to eliminate false light
altogether")). See Bruce A. McKenna, Comment False Light: Invasion of Privacy?, 15 TULSA
L.J. 113, 139 (1979). The Zimmerman article is undoubtedly the most thorough article dis-
cussing the false light theory. Zimmerman concludes that "[flalse light invasion of privacy has
caused enough theoretical and practical problems to make a compelling case for a stricter
standard of birth control in the evolution of the common law." Zimmerman, supra, at 366.
181. Diamond Shamrock, 844 SW.2d at 206 (citing Renwick v. News & Observer Publish-
ing Co., 310 N.C. 312, 312 S.E.2d 405, 412 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Sullivan
v. Pulitzer Broadcasting Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 479-80 (Mo. 1986); Arrington v. New York
Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433, 434 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1146 (1983);
Yeager v. Local Union 20, Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 6 Ohio 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666,
669-70 (1983); Falwell v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204, 1206 (W.D. Va. 1981)).
182. Justice Gonzalez observed that both false light and defamation require that the state-
ments must be false to be actionable. Id. at 207. False light damages are typically for mental
anguish, but physical illness and harm to commercial interests have also been permitted, and
these are essentially the same type of damages sought in defamation actions. Id. at 207-08.
False light overlaps with two other categories of invasion of privacy, appropriation and unrea-
sonable publicity. Id. at 208. While recognizing that the commentators disagree with respect
to the theoretical distinctions between false light and other torts, particularly defamation, Jus-
tice Gonzalez concluded that "[iun practice, the theoretical distinctions between false light and
defamation have proven largely illusory." Id. Finally, Justice Gonzalez observed that the six
false light cases considered by Texas courts all were filed or could have been filed under an-
other legal theory. Id. at 207-08 (citing Gill v. Snow, 644 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1982, no writ); Wilhite v. H.E. Butt Co., 812 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
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lacks many of the procedural limitations that accompany actions for defa-
mation thereby aggravating the existing tension between the constitutional
right of free speech and tort law.18 3 Finally, Justice Gonzalez questioned
whether a remedy for non-defamatory speech should exist at all. 184
Justice Hecht stated in a concurring and dissenting opinion that he would
not address where the tort should be recognized, but that he would render
judgment for Diamond Shamrock and not remand the case for a new
trial.185 Justice Hecht reasoned that Mendez could have submitted the ac-
tual malice element in response to Diamond Shamrock's objection to the
charge, but he chose not to do so.86 Justice Hecht added that it did not
serve justice to remand the case for a trial on a hypothetical cause of action,
thereby subjecting Diamond Shamrock to a second trial on an uncertain
legal theory. 187 Justice Hightower filed a concurring opinion in which he
affirmed his view of the right to privacy under the Texas Constitution.1 88
Justice Hightower's opinion is perplexing, though, because the constitutional
right of privacy had no applicability to the case. 189 Finally, Justice Doggett,
joined by Justices Mauzy and Gammage, dissented and argued that the false
light theory should be recognized as a viable tort. 190 The dissenters also
opined that there were sufficient distinctions between defamation and other
torts and the false light theory of invasion of privacy that the false light and
other torts could coexist. 19 1
7. Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Although individuals continue to urge the courts to adopt an implied con-
tractual covenant or a tortious duty of good faith and fair dealing in the
employer-employee relationship, the Texas Supreme Court 19 2 and the courts
1991, no writ); National Bonding Agency v. Demeson, 648 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1983, no writ); Covington v. Houston Post, 743 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1987, no writ); Clarke v. Denton Publishing Co., 793 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1990, writ denied)).
183. Id. at 207, 208-210 (identifying procedural and substantive safeguards that apply to
protect free speech in defamation actions, but which are not available in false light actions).
184. Id. at 211.
185. Id. at 212 (Hecht, J., concurring and dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992)).
188. Id. at 202-03 (Hightower, J., concurring).
189. See id. at 204 n. 1 (Gonzalez, J., concurring) (recognizing that the supreme court had
not applied the state action doctrine to the Texas Constitution, and that Mendez never made a
claim that his constitutional privacy rights were violated).
190. Id. at 214 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (citing Industrial Found. of the South v. Texas
Indus. Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668, 682 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977) (describing four
parts of the tort of invasion of privacy). The dissenters characterized the court's action as an
"assault on the right to privacy in Texas." Id. at 213. However, as Justice Mauzy once ob-
served in another case, "the makeup of this court has changed." Melody Home Mfg. Co. v.
Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 362 (Tex. 1987) (Mauzy, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 218.
192. See Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 530, 532 n.1 (Feb. 3,
1993) (per curiam) (noting that supreme court has declined to recognize a general duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the employer-employee relationship); McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 807 S.W.2d 577, 577 (Tex. 1991), afj'g 757 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1988); Winters v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 795 S.W.2d 723, 724 n.2 (Tex. 1990).
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of appeals 193 have refused to recognize such an obligation. It appears that
the supreme court laid the issue to rest in McClendon v. Ingersoll-Rand
Co. 194 On remand from the United States Supreme Court, 195 the Texas
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision that there is not an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relation-
ship. 196 The McClendon court of appeals specifically declined to extend the
Arnold v. National County Mutual Fire Insurance Co. 197 duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the employment relationship. 198 It held that the special
relationship between insurers and insureds is not equally applicable to em-
ployers and employees, and that to extend it to the employment relationship
would be tantamount to imposing such a duty on all commercial relation-
See also Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co., 932 F.2d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1991) (Texas courts do not
recognize covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Caton v.
Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 948-49 (5th Cir. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of
good faith and fair dealing in employment relationship); Guzman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
756 F. Supp. 994, 1000-01 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith
and fair dealing in employment relationship); Nicholls v. Columbia Gas Dev. Corp., No. 89-
2418 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1990) (Texas courts do not recognize claim for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract); Haynes v. Henry S. Miller
Management Corp., No. CA3-88-2556-T (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1990) (Texas Supreme Court has
not recognized implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Rodriguez v. Benson Proper-
ties, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 275, 276-77 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (no duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment relationship); Bowser v. McDonald's Corp., 714 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (Texas courts do not recognize duty of good faith and fair dealing in employment
relationship).
193. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Hatridge, 831 S.W.2d 65, 71 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied) (no cause of action for breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in
employment context); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d 466, 468-69 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ granted on other grounds) (rejecting claim for breach of duty of good faith
and fair dealing, court recognized that current mood of a majority of the supreme court is to
adhere to at-will rule); Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307, 312 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (neither the legislature nor the supreme court have recognized an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Hicks v.
Baylor Univ. Medical Ctr., 789 S.W.2d 299, 303-04 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied)
(supreme court expressly rejected an invitation to recognize an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing in the employment relationship); Lumpkin v. H & C Communications, Inc.,
755 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (court rejected im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment relationship).
In Lumpkin the sole point of error on appeal to the court of appeals was whether an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is inherent in the employer-employee relationship.
Lumpkin, 755 S.W.2d at 539. The court of appeals overruled Lumpkin's point of error, id. at
540, and Lumpkin appealed the issue to the supreme court. Lumkpin v. H & C Communica-
tions, Inc., 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 13 (Oct. 16, 1988). Lumpkin's application for a writ of error
had been pending before the supreme court for approximately one year when the court decided
McClendon. Curiously, the supreme court did not grant Lumpkin's application when it
granted McClendon's application and consolidate the cases. Nevertheless, shortly after Mc-
Clendon, the court denied Lumpkin's application for a writ of error. 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 114
(Dec. 6, 1989).
194. 757 S.W.2d 816, 819-20 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988), rev'd on other
grounds, 779 S.W.2d 69 (Tex. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 133 (1990), affid on remand, 807 S.W.2d
577 (Tex. 1991).
195. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
196. McClendon, 807 S.W.2d at 577.
197. 725 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. 1987) (duty of good faith and fair dealing extended to insurers
and insureds).
198. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 819-20.
1993] 1425
SMU LAW REVIEW
ships. ' 99 Imposing the duty on the employment relationship would also vio-
late the supreme court's disapproval of restrictions on free movement of
employees in the workplace. 200 Finally, the plethora of legislation restrict-
ing an employer's right to discharge an employee indicates that such a
change in policy affecting the employer-employee relationship should be left
to the legislature.20'
8. Common Law Right to a Work Place Free From Sexual Harassment
In Graham v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ,202 Shirley Graham was employed by
Greenwade Services, Inc., which provided janitorial services for Atlantic
Richfield Company (ARCO), for six years. During her employment, Gra-
ham alleged that one of ARCO's employees, Jimmy Epperson, repeatedly
subjected Graham to verbal abuse and sexual harassment while she worked
on ARCO's premises. Specifically, Epperson alleged that Graham made un-
welcome offers to have sex with him and that the remarks were upsetting,
degrading, interfered with her employment, and caused her to be ill. Shortly
before her termination, Graham reported the incidents to ARCO's human
relations department and she was advised to also inform Greenwade. Gra-
ham was eventually terminated by Greenwade, and it was undisputed that
Greenwade was never informed of Epperson's conduct before her discharge.
Graham sued ARCO for negligence alleging that ARCO had a duty to
maintain a work environment for all persons free of sexual harassment and
abusive conduct by its employees. Specifically, Graham alleged ARCO, as
the owner and occupier of the premises, owed a duty to employees of con-
tractors working at ARCO's facilities to provide a safe place to work and to
reduce or eliminate those conditions that pose an unreasonable risk of harm
to employees of contractors working at ARCO's facilities. The trial court
granted ARCO's motion for directed verdict and held that ARCO did not
owe a duty of care to Graham. 20 3 The court of appeals affirmed, holding as
a matter of law that ARCO did not owe such a duty to Graham because the
"dangerous condition" (Epperson's conduct) was an unforeseeable inten-
tional tort and the sole intervening cause of any injuries suffered by
Graham. 2o4
199. Id. at 819.
200. Id. at 820 (citing Bergman v. Norris of Houston, 734 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. 1987); Hill v.
Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987)).
201. McClendon, 757 S.W.2d at 820 (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; Watson v. Zep Mfg.
Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Molder v. South-
western Bell Tel. Co., 665 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1983, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)).
202. No. 13-91-417-CV, 1993 WL 5041 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 14, 1993, n.w.h.).





1. Article 8307c Retaliatory Discharge
The legislative purpose of article 8307c20 5 is to "protect persons who are
entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law and to prevent
them from being discharged by reason of taking steps to collect such bene-
fits." '206 A plaintiff bringing an 8307c claim207 has the burden of establishing
a causal link between the discharge from employment and the claim for
workers' compensation. 20 8 A plaintiff need not prove that he was discharged
solely because of his workers' compensation claim; he need only prove that
his claim was a determining or contributing factor in his discharge.2° 9 Thus,
even if other reasons for discharge exist, the plaintiff may still recover dam-
ages if retaliation is also a reason. 210 Causation may be established by direct
or circumstantial evidence and by the reasonable inferences drawn from
such evidence. 2" Once the link is established, the employer must rebut the
alleged discrimination by showing there was a legitimate reason behind the
discharge.212
Article 8307c provides that a successful plaintiff is entitled to reasonable
damages and is entitled to reinstatement to his or her former position.213
205. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c (Vernon Supp. 1993). Section 1 provides:
No person may discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any em-
ployee because the employee has in good faith filed a claim, hired a lawyer to
represent him in a claim, instituted, or caused to be instituted, in good faith, any
proceeding under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, or has testified or is
about to testify in any such proceeding.
Id.
206. Carnation Co. v. Borner, 610 S.W.2d 450, 453 (Tex. 1980).
207. An employee bringing an 8307c cause of action against a governmental unit is not
required to comply with the notice provisions of the Texas Tort Claims Act, TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101(a) (Vernon 1986). Williams v. Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist.,
816 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
208. Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
writ denied). In Paragon, the court identified four factors in concluding that sufficient evi-
dence supported the finding of a causal link between the filing of the claim and the discharge:
(1) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff were aware of his compensation claim;
(2) those making the decision to discharge the plaintiff expressed a negative attitude toward the
plaintiff's injured condition; (3) the company failed to adhere to established company policies
with regard to progressive disciplinary action; and (4) the company discriminated in its treat-
ment of the plaintiff in comparison to other employees allegedly guilty of similar infractions.
Id. at 658. These four factors may be useful in analyzing whether there is circumstantial
evidence to support a causal link between the filing of a workers' compensation claim and a
subsequent discharge.
209. Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Martin, 844 S.W.2d 229, 232, 1992 WL 214014, at
*2 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ requested); Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez, 835 S.W.2d 826,
833 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied); Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 84
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ); Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385
(Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied); Azar Nut Co. v. Caille, 720 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1986), affid, 734 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. 1987).
210. Santex, Inc. v. Cunningham, 618 S.W.2d 557, 558-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981,
no writ).
211. Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes, 821 S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1992, no writ); Paragon, 783 S.W.2d at 658.
212. Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards, 624 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1981, writ refd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 991 (1982).
213. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase "reasonable damages"
in section two to embrace both actual and exemplary damages. 214 Actual
damages can include lost past wages, lost future wages, lost past retirement,
lost future retirement, and other benefits which are ascertainable with rea-
sonable certainty. Employees seeking reinstatement on the ground that they
were wrongfully discharged must show that they are presently able to per-
form the duties of the job that they had before the injury.215
A number of recent cases have addressed situations where employees have
been initially afforded short or long term disability benefits, and then such
benefits have been altered. In Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Martin,216
Mike Martin sued his employer under article 8307c, and the jury awarded
him $402,000 in lost wages and employment benefits. Martin was a lineman
working for Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO) when he
was seriously injured through contact with a 7,200-volt line. Electricity en-
tered his body through his right hand and went out through his right but-
tock. He filed a workers' compensation claim in November of 1986. He was
so severely and permanently injured that he could never return to his work
as a lineman. For the period of time that Martin was on sick leave,
SWEPCO continued to pay his full salary. As a condition for receiving his
full salary, however, Martin was required to endorse his workers' compensa-
tion benefits to SWEPCO. SWEPCO initially placed Martin into a rehabili-
tation program that was designed to retrain injured employees for differentjobs within the company. Shortly before Martin filed a lawsuit against the
manufacturer of the bucket truck that Martin was using at the time of his
injury, Martin's attorney notified the Industrial Accident Board, SWEPCO
and SWEPCO's workers' compensation carrier about his representation and
also obtained a setting for a prehearing conference. SWEPCO initially
agreed to meet with Martin's attorney, but that meeting was canceled after
Martin's attorney informed SWEPCO that it would be a waste of time for
them to meet if SWEPCO would not allow him to review its file about the
truck's manufacturer and the accident. Shortly thereafter, SWEPCO
changed Martin's status from active employee to long-term disability, and
informed Martin of this change by telephone. The change in status reduced
Martin's gross income from $2,500 per month to approximately $1,500 per
month. SWEPCO further reduced the $1,500 payment by the amount of
Martin's weekly workers' compensation payment. As a result, Martin re-
ceived $573.24 per month from SWEPCO and $940.33 per month in work-
ers' compensation benefits.
The jury found that Martin's dismissal from the rehabilitation program
and the change in status to long-term disability from active employment
constituted a violation of article 8307c. SWEPCO argued on appeal that the
change in status did not constitute an activity prohibited under the Workers'
214. Azar Nut, 734 S.W.2d at 669.
215. Schrader v. Artco Bell Corp., 579 S.W.2d 534, 540 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
216. 844 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1992, writ requested).
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Compensation Act. In dismissing this argument, the court of appeals stated
"an employer may terminate at will an employee who is off work with a job-
related injury without violating the proscription against retaliatory discharge
so long as the employer's motive is not to discriminate against an employee
for exercising his or her rights under the Workers' Compensation Act."'217
However, the court observed that while the company had no duty to con-
tinue Martin's employment or to provide him with a rehabilitation program,
because the company chose to continue his employment and to provide him
a rehabilitation program, SWEPCO could not discharge Martin from the
program because of his workers' compensation claim. 218  Overruling
SWEPCO's evidentiary challenge, the court further stated that placing Mar-
tin on disability at a time which was in close proximity to the notification
from Martin's attorney that he was seeking a lump sum settlement consti-
tuted some evidence to support the jury's verdict that SWEPCO discharged
Martin in violation of article 8307c. 219
In Texas Department of Corrections v. Gibson,220 Gibson brought suit
under article 8307c alleging that the Texas Department of Corrections'
change of institutional policy eliminating limited duty assignments was dis-
criminatory. At the time of Gibson's injury, the institutional policy permit-
ted a corrections officer to work on limited duty assignments. One year
later, the Texas Department of Corrections changed its policy so that limited
duty assignments were no longer available. All correction officers had to be
physically able to perform any assignment to which they could be assigned.
When the policy became effective, Gibson was terminated. The jury
awarded him $150,000 for lost past and future wages.
On appeal, the Texas Department of Corrections argued that there was no
article 8307c violation because Gibson was terminated in accordance with
the generally applicable new policy that all corrections officers had to be
physically able to perform any assignment to which they could be assigned.
The reason for the new policy was the Department's concern that if a limited
duty employee became injured or reinjured on the job, the state might be
liable for his new injuries. Gibson stated that Department supervisory per-
sonnel had discussed with him the fact that he had hired an attorney or filed
a workers' compensation claim, and that the Department's attitude toward
him changed after he filed his claim. In affirming the jury verdict, the court
of appeals observed that once Gibson took steps to initiate a workers' com-
pensation claim, the Department was required to show good cause to sup-
port a subsequent decision to discharge him.22' In response to the
Department's evidentiary challenge, the court held that there was evidence
from which the jury could have concluded that the policy change was due to
217. Martin, 844 S.W.2d at 232 (citation omitted).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 233.
220. No. 01-91-00482-CV, 1992 WL 141138 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.], June 25,
1992, no writ) (not designated for publication).
221. Id. at *2 (citing Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1990, writ denied)).
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workers' compensation claims in general or Gibson's claim in particular,
that the policy about duty reassignments was in reality a policy about work-
ers' compensation, and that the real motive for the policy change was to
terminate employees with past or pending compensation claims. 222 The
court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support a circumstan-
tial case that the Department violated article 8307c. 223
In Barnes v. Exxon Corp. ,224 Beverly Barnes injured her back, and Ex-
xon's medical department treated Barnes for back pain and placed her on
restricted duty. Two days later, Barnes' work restrictions were removed and
she resumed performance of her normal duties. Later, Barnes reported that
another physician was treating her for anemia and bone spurs in her neck.
A few months later, Barnes' physician released her to work provided that
she not wear her tool pouch, not lift more than 10 pounds, and not engage in
repetitive bending, stooping, climbing or jumping. Because Exxon had no
positions to accommodate her condition, Exxon instructed Barnes to remain
at home. While at home, Barnes received temporary benefits under the Ex-
xon benefit plan. Subsequently, Barnes applied for workers' compensation
benefits. Prior to this time, Exxon treated Barnes' illness as non-industrial
because she had not filed a claim for workers' compensation. Because Exxon
had no positions available to accommodate her work restrictions, Exxon
granted Barnes a six-month leave of absence beginning on the date Barnes'
temporary disability benefits were due to end.225
Subsequently, Barnes returned to work with a restriction that she not lift
more than twenty-five pounds, and one year later, Barnes received a full
medical release. Three months later, Barnes reinjured her back and was
under medical care for several more months. Barnes' physician again gave
her a work release to perform work of a light sedentary nature. Because the
company had no positions available to accommodate Barnes' work restric-
tions, Exxon instructed Barnes to remain at home. On the date Barnes' disa-
bility was due to expire, Barnes returned to work with a release from her
physician that stated Barnes could return to work on an "as-tolerated" basis.
Exxon's physician concluded that Barnes was released for work with restric-
tions. Unable to find a suitable position for Barnes, Exxon terminated her
employment.
Barnes then filed a grievance protesting her termination. After a meeting
between the refinery manager and a union representative, the manager in-
structed Exxon's physician to examine Barnes. Exxon's physician concluded
Barnes was fit to work without restrictions; therefore, Exxon permitted
Barnes to return to work, but placed her on a twelve-month period of proba-
tion. Because of her absences from work, Barnes signed a document agree-
222. Gibson, 1992 WL 141138, at *3.
223. Id. (citing Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1990, writ denied) (noting that "[d]irect evidence of the prohibited intent is not typically
available, and is not required.")).
224. No. H-89-2614, 1991 WL 338256 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 1991).
225. Normally, an employee is terminated and placed on long-term disability after receiv-
ing temporary benefits for 52 weeks. Id. at * 1.
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ing to the terms of her probation. One of the terms provided that if she
missed more than 15 days of work during the next year or had over three
incidents of absenteeism her employment would be terminated. A few
months later, Barnes reported to the Exxon medical department and was
certified unfit for work due to depression. Barnes was thereafter admitted to
Baywood Hospital and placed under the care of a psychiatrist who con-
firmed a diagnosis of severe clinical depression. Barnes remained hospital-
ized for several weeks and was thereafter released to return to work.
Pursuant to the provisions of her probation, Barnes was discharged.
Barnes sued Exxon alleging that Exxon retaliated against her in violation
of article 8307c by not allowing her to return to work until almost a year
after her medical restrictions were removed, by requiring her to perform
heavy labor, by initially denying her workers' compensation claim, and by
withholding a $10,000 workers' compensation award. While Barnes argued
that the causal link in retaliatory discharge cases may be established by the
closeness in time between the injury and the adverse action, the federal dis-
trict court found that the handling of each of the Barnes' complaints com-
ported with Exxon's guidelines relating to disabled employees. 226 Further,
the court observed that Barnes did not contradict the summary judgment
evidence that no employee with long-term restrictions which interfered with
his work duties was permitted to return to work.227 Accordingly, the court
granted Exxon's motion for summary judgment. 228
Two recent cases concluded that "absence control" policies, if applied in a
non-discriminatory manner, do not violate article 8307c. In a case of first
impression, Swearingen v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. ,229 Vergie Swear-
ingen sustained a work-related injury and was unable to return to work for
medical reasons for about four years. Approximately thirty months after her
injury, the company personnel manager wrote Swearingen a letter referenc-
ing the absence control provision and terminated Swearingen effective that
day because her medical leave absence exceeded 24 months. Swearingen
subsequently attempted to return to work at Owens-Coming after her physi-
cian released her to return to work with certain restrictions. Swearingen
allegedly then discovered that Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corporation termi-
nated her employment. Swearingen then brought suit claiming that Owens-
Corning retaliated against her for filing a workers' compensation claim in
violation of article 8307c. The federal district court granted Owens-Corn-
ing's motion for summary judgment, and Swearingen appealed.
On appeal Swearingen argued that the absence control policy violated ar-
ticle 8307c, relying on an opinion of the Texas Attorney General. 230 The
Fifth Circuit observed that the absence control policy at issue in the Attor-
226. Id. at * 4-5.
227. Id. at *5.
228. Id.
229. 968 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1992). While there was no Texas case deciding the issue, the
court nevertheless declined to certify the question to the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 564.
Accordingly, the court attempted to predict Texas law. Id.
230. Id. (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-227 (1984)).
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ney General Opinion was an across-the-board policy which automatically
discharged any employee on leave without pay for more than six weeks, in-
cluding employees on leave who collected workers' compensation benefits. 231
The court noted that the Attorney General concluded that an employer
must have a legitimate job-related reason, other then a mere leave of ab-
sence, before it may discharge an employee who is on leave due to a job-
related injury and who has collected workers' compensation benefits. 232
While the court stated that it regarded the opinion of the Texas Attorney
General as highly persuasive, the court rejected the opinion as an overly
broad construction of article 8307c. 233 The court affirmed the summary
judgment and held that violation of a neutrally-applied absence control pol-
icy is not one of the four prohibited acts enumerated in article 8307c.234
In Allen v. Alumax Aluminum Corp.,235 Paul Allen suffered an on-the-job
injury. While employed at Alumax, Allen was a member of the union. The
collective bargaining agreement that governed Allen's conditions of employ-
ment provided that employees with less than 10 years of plant seniority may
remain off the payroll for up to one year. Allen was an employee with less
than 10 years seniority. More than one year later, Alumax removed Allen's
name from the plant seniority list which effectively terminated his employ-
ment. Allen sued Alumax for retaliatory discharge. Alumax moved for
summary judgment on the basis that Allen could not establish causal con-
nection between his workers' compensation claim and his discharge. The
trial court granted the motion and Allen appealed. Affirming the summary
judgment, the court of appeals court noted that Alumax's summary judg-
ment proof showed that it followed the collective bargaining agreement pro-
cedure in a non-discriminatory manner when it terminated Allen.236 The
evidence showed that Allen could not think of any other reason for his ter-
mination other than that during his deposition he stated his subjective belief
that Alumax terminated him because he filed a workers' compensation claim
and because he could think of no other reason for his termination. The
court held that Allen's subjective belief was insufficient to defeat Alumax's
summary judgment.237
In Ethicon, Inc. v. Martinez,238 Alma Martinez was employed as a channel
swagger, which is a repetitive-motion job requiring the employee to make the
same wrist movement over 7,000 times per day. In September 1987, Marti-
nez went to the company's medical director complaining of pain in her left
wrist. After examination, the company's medical doctor referred the plain-
tiff to an orthopedic surgeon who diagnosed Martinez as suffering from De-
Quervain Syndrome, a condition associated with repetitive-motion trauma.
231. Swearingen, 968 S.W.2d at 564 (citing Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. JM-227 at 1).
232. Swearingen, 968 S.W.2d at 564.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 563.
235. No. 05-91-00750-CV, 1992 WL 33002 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Feb. 7, 1992, writ denied)
(not designated for publication).
236. Id. at *4.
237. Id.
238. 835 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, writ denied).
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Martinez had surgery on her left wrist and was later released to return to
work. Martinez reported that when placed on a less strenuous job, she did
not have problems, but that radiating pain recurred when she returned to
her old job. In July 1988, Martinez had surgery to remove a ganglion cyst
and was placed on medical leave from July 5 until November 28, 1988, when
she returned to work. The next day Martinez reported to the company's
medical department complaining of pain and swelling in her left wrist. The
company medical doctor prescribed a conservative course of therapy -for
Martinez. Several days later the company medical director stated that Mar-
tinez's wrist appeared normal and concluded that Martinez was able to con-
tinue working with only minor discomfort. Subsequently, Martinez
attended an Industrial Accident Board Prehearing Conference on her work-
ers' compensation claim, and her claim was settled for $12,000. After the
proceeding, the company's personnel manager held a debriefing during
which the company's medical director, who attended the prehearing confer-
ence, told the personnel manager what Martinez and her attorney allegedly
had said about Martinez's continued pain in her left wrist. The assistant to
the company medical director testified that the medical director stormed
into the medical department, slammed the door behind him and exclaimed,
"Damn it. Alma got $12,000 and I'm not going to let her back in the
plant!"239 The company medical director recommended that Martinez be
placed on medical disqualification, which was tantamount to discharge.
When Martinez reported to work she was discharged. 24° Martinez then
sued Ethicon for retaliatory discharge in violation of article 8307c. The jury
awarded Martinez $163,500 in actual damages and $900,000 in exemplary
damages. Ethicon appealed.
Ethicon defended the suit on the theory that Martinez could no longer
work in a repetitive-motion job without wrist pain and possible risk of re-
injury. Ethicon alleged at the trial that there were no other jobs available for
Martinez and that it was on the "horns of a dilemma"; therefore, medical
discharge was the only reasonable alternative. Martinez argued that the evi-
dence showed a company bias against employees who received a workers'
compensation lump-sum award. In its review of Ethicon's sufficiency of the
evidence challenge, the court of appeals concluded that the following evi-
dence supported the jury's verdict: the company medical director admitted
that one of his duties was to reduce workers' compensation costs; the com-
pany medical director recommended that Martinez be medically discharged
without an additional examination and in spite of medical reports that Mar-
tinez could return to the performance of her regular work; and the company
medical director's medical records indicate that Martinez's condition would
be reviewed at a later date and, even though requested by Martinez, no re-
239. Id. at 829.
240. After Martinez's discharge, her orthopedic surgeon again examined Martinez and
found that her wrist appeared quite well. Martinez's physician also gave Martinez two other
doctor's statements saying that she had recovered "nicely" from her wrist surgery and that she
should be capable of performing her normal work activities. Id. at 830.
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examination or re-evaluation ever occurred. 24 1 Accordingly, the jury's ver-
dict was affirmed.242
In Otis Engineering Corp. v. Pennington,243 Otis laid off employees accord-
ing to seniority. Otis then changed that policy along the following criteria:
supervisors identified critical skills (skills for which employees were trained
or certified); supervisors identified employees who had at least one critical
skill; if the critical skills were equal, performance appraisals would be used
to determine who should be laid off; finally, if all of these factors were equal,
employees would be laid off pursuant to seniority. After the policy change,
Pennington injured his back on the job. Subsequently Otis laid off a number
of employees, some with more seniority than Pennington, then two months
later, Otis laid off eight employees including Pennington. Pennington sued
Otis alleging that he was discharged because of his workers' compensation
claim. The jury found for Pennington, and Otis appealed the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the jury's verdict. The court of appeals affirmed. 2"
In the quality control department, Pennington's department, Pennington's
supervisor identified six critical skills. The supervisor testified that Pen-
nington would not have been laid off if he had any of these critical skills.
However, the evidence showed that during his employment at Otis, Pen-
nington was a foreman and/or a supervisor over three of the critical skills.
Pennington also was at one time an inspector, which required him to actu-
ally perform the task supervised. Pennington testified that he would not
have been chosen a supervisor had he not been competent to do the work. In
his performance appraisal, Pennington received "commendable" rating in
seven categories, including safety. The court noted that the performance
ratings for safety refer to on-the-job injuries as a consideration and inquire
whether the employee incurred any lost-time injuries and whether the em-
ployee used safe working habits. The court also observed that Pennington's
first report of injury form stated that his accident was caused by his failure
to use a safety appliance or to observe a regulation. Furthermore, the report
was in Pennington's personnel file which was reviewed in making the layoff
decision. Accordingly, the court held that the circumstantial evidence and
the reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the jury's finding of
wrongful termination. 245
In Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias,246 Gonzalo Arias sustained an on-the-job
back injury. The evidence was unclear as to whether Arias reported the
injury to his supervisor on the day of his injury. The evidence did establish,
however, that a fellow employee who witnessed the accident reported Arias'
injury to a Worsham supervisor the day after the accident. Although exper-
241. Id. at 834.
242. Id. at 836.
243. 1992 WL 172389, No. 05-91-00002-CV (Tex. App.-Dallas, July 23, 1992, no writ)
(not designated for publication).
244. Id. at *10.
245. Id. at *7-8 (citing Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied)).
246. 831 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
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iencing pain, Arias chose not to immediately seek medical care after the
accident. Instead, Arias continued to report to work for two days following
his accident hoping he would feel better. On the third day after his accident,
however, Arias was unable to report to work due to his back pain. Arias
failed to notify Worsham of his inability to work as a result of his back
injury. After a two-day absence, Arias returned to work and was informed
by Worsham that he no longer was employed by the company. Worsham
explained to Arias that they had assumed he quit when he failed to report to
work for two consecutive days. Worsham based this assumption on an al-
leged statement made by Arias prior to the injury that he would quit if he
was not given a part-time position with the company. Since no part-time
positions were available, Worsham thought that Arias quit when he did not
show up for work. On the day of the discharge, Arias asked Worsham to
send him to a doctor because of his back injury. Worsham refused to send
Arias to the doctor because he was no longer an employee. Arias sued for
wrongful discharge and the jury awarded him $1,243,300 in actual and puni-
tive damages. Worsham appealed.
Worsham argued on appeal that there was no cause of action for wrongful
discharge because Arias failed to make a claim for workers' compensation
benefits until two days after his discharge. Rejecting this argument, the
court of appeals stated all that is required to pursue a claim under article
8307c is that the employee took steps toward instituting a claim, not that a
claim actually be filed. 247 The court found that by informing Worsham of
his injury before his employment ended, Arias instituted a proceeding under
article 8307c. 248 The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to
support the jury's liability finding. 249 The court noted that the record re-
vealed Arias was discharged shortly after Worsham was given notice of the
injury.250 Moreover, the evidence established that Worsham had a negative
attitude towards workers' compensation claims in general and Arias' back
injury in particular. 25 1 Further, there was testimony from Worsham that
established that if the injury had never occurred, there would have been no
reason to terminate Arias.252 Because the court found that the evidence was
insufficient to support the award of actual damages the case was reversed
and remanded for a new trial on all issues.2 53
In Investment Properties Management, Inc. v. Montes,2 5 4 Elsa Montes was
injured on the job, and she initially sought medical assistance from a doctor
in Juarez, Mexico because she did not know about workers' compensation.
The Juarez doctor placed Montes on medical leave for two weeks; however,
Montes did not recover after two weeks. She subsequently began treatment
247. Id. (citing Mid-South Bottling Co. v. Cigainero, 799 S.W.2d 385, 389 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1990, writ denied)).





253. Id. at 85-88.
254. 821 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
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with an El Paso orthopedic surgeon. Subsequently, Montes' employer hired
a temporary housekeeper to replace Montes while she was incapacitated.
Montes' supervisor testified that she intended to make the temporary house-
keeper a permanent employee at the end of a ninety-day probationary period
if Montes did not return to work. The supervisor, however, did not inform
anyone of her intentions. Approximately eight months after being injured,
Montes obtained a note from her doctor releasing her to work with no heavy
lifting. Upon returning to her employment, she was notified by her supervi-
sor that she no longer had a job. Montes sued for wrongful discharge. The
jury awarded Montes $10,000 in actual damages and $100,000 in exemplary
damages and the employer appealed.
Addressing the employer's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the
court of appeals observed that there was circumstantial evidence from which
the jury could conclude that Montes was wrongfully discharged. 25 5 At the
time of Montes' discharge, the employer knew about Montes' workers' com-
pensation claim and knew that she was represented by an attorney. 2 56 Fur-
ther, there was conflicting evidence of a negative attitude toward Montes'
injury. Allegedly, Montes' supervisor was upset after Montes explained
what had happened with respect to her injury. Montes testified that her
supervisor told her that she should have been more careful. Further, the
court observed that the supervisor did not immediately submit the Em-
ployer's First Report of Injury to the Industrial Accident Board, that no
personnel paperwork was processed discharging Montes, and that there was
not any personnel documents to indicate that the status of the temporary
housekeeper was changed to permanent employment status.257
In Lester v. Houston Coca Cola Bottling Co. ,258 Joseph Lester was dis-
charged by Coca Cola for falsification of records or misrepresentation of ma-
terial information. Lester injured his back on the job and over the next
eleven months he reinjured his back five times. After one of the injuries,
Lester was examined by Dr. Alexander Brodsky, an orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Brodsky gave Lester a written form entitled "Back Instructions" which
included the line: "work: okay." Lester had subsequent appointments to see
Dr. Brodsky on three occasions during the next two weeks, all of which he
canceled or missed. During the period he was off, Lester did not provide
Coca Cola with a doctor's authorization to return to work or an authoriza-
tion stating that he was under medical care and needed to remain off from
work. When Lester returned to work he was informed by his supervisor that
he needed a doctor's release. Lester returned with an unsigned, undated
form entitled "Back Instructions" that he had obtained on November 15.
Another employee of Coca Cola contacted Dr. Brodsky's office and was in-
formed that Lester had not seen the doctor since November 4 and had not
255. Id. at 694 (citing Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.-
El Paso 1989, writ denied)).
256. Montes, 821 S.W.2d at 694.
257. Id. at 695.
258. No. C14-90-00567-CV, 1991 WL 168682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.], Sept. 5,
1991, no writ) (not designated for publication).
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yet been released to work. Coca Cola discharged Lester and he sued for
wrongful discharge. The jury found for Coca Cola. Lester appealed and the
court of appeals affirmed.259 The court stated that Lester's attempt to tie his
discharge to a workers' compensation claim was unpersuasive to the jury
because Coca Cola provided independent reasons for his termination. 26°
Coca Cola's defense was that Lester violated company policy through mis-
representations to his supervisor as prohibited by the company rules, and
that the reason for discharge offered by Coca Cola supported the jury's
finding.2 6'
In Rodriguez v. Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. ,262 the federal district court
addressed whether an employee may bring an article 8307c claim based upon
her discharge for failure to enroll in an "Employee Injury Benefit Plan" that
would waive the employee's rights under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Margarita Rodriguez argued that she was terminated because she refused to
sign documents which enrolled her in a benefit plan and waived her rights
under the workers' compensation laws of Texas. Texas Health Enterprises
removed Rodriguez's lawsuit based upon the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) and Rodriguez moved to remand the case to state
court. In a case of first impression, the court held that Rodriguez's wrongful
termination claim was based on her refusal to take part in the Employee
Injury Benefit Plan. 263 In the absence of the plan the court found that Rod-
riguez would not possess a claim for wrongful discharge; therefore, the court
found that the wrongful discharge claim related to an ERISA plan and thus
preempted by ERISA and denied the motion to remand. 264
In Dal-Briar Corp. v. Baskette,265 Dal-Briar filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus after the trial court granted a motion consolidating three lawsuits
by three employees who alleged that their respective terminations were part
of a common practice to discriminate against employees who file workers'
compensation claims. The respective plaintiffs were terminated (or in one
case voluntarily quit) in July 1988, August 1988, and November 1989. Dal-
Briar argued that its defensive theories in each case were very different. The
plaintiffs urged that the common thread of each worker's termination after
making a compensation claim was enough to justify consolidation. The
court of appeals recognized that while consolidation is a matter within the
broad discretion of the trial court, it is not without limiting factors. 266
While the three cases involved common issues of law, and the evidence
would substantially overlap, the court concluded that the three cases never-
theless arose from three distinct factual scenarios, and the defensive theory
in each case was unique.267 Accordingly, the court ordered the trial court to
259. Id. at *3.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. No. 4:92CV23, 1992 WL 247022 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 1992).
263. Id. at *2.
264. Id.
265. 833 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, orig. proceeding).
266. Id. at 615 (citing Womack v. Berry, 156 Tex. 44, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (1956)).
267. Dal-Briar, 833 S.W.2d at 616.
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vacate its order of consolidation. 268
In Klein Independent School District v. Noack,269 Paul Noack sued the
school district for wrongful discharge. During the trial the court allowed
Noack to offer into evidence findings of fact and conclusions of law rendered
by the Texas Employment Commission (TEC) as a result of his unemploy-
ment compensation claim. The TEC concluded in that proceeding that
Noack was terminated by the employer without good cause and without any
misconduct on Noack's part. The jury found for Noack and the school dis-
trict appealed. The court of appeals reversed the judgment and remanded
the cause for new trial because the court found that the admission of the
TEC findings and conclusions was not competent evidence supporting a find-
ing that the school district wrongfully discharged Noack under article
8307C.
2 70
The issue of whether article 8307c applies to non-subscribers was ad-
dressed by the federal district court in Keyser v. Kroger Co. 271 While Kroger
urged a narrow interpretation of article 8307c, the court concluded that arti-
cle 8307c was a cause of action available to any worker, regardless of
whether the employer was a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation
Act.272
Finally, federal district courts continue to follow Jones v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc. 273 in finding that article 8307c is a civil action arising under the
workers' compensation laws of Texas and, therefore, not removable to fed-
eral court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c). 274 However, an article 8307c
retaliation claim may nevertheless be removed if it is pendent to a federal
question claim. 275
2 Commission on Human Rights Act
In Speer v. Presbyterian Children's Home,276 the supreme court granted
writ of error to determine whether the Presbyterian Children's Home and
Service Agency (Agency) was a religious corporation exempt from the gen-
eral prohibition of discriminatory hiring practices in the Commission on
Human Rights Act (CHRA). 277 Georgette Speer applied for the position of
268. Id.
269. 830 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1992, writ denied).
270. Id. at 798-99.
271. 800 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
272. Id. at 477.
273. 931 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir. 1991). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment
and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1765-66 (1992) (discussing
Fifth Circuit's decision in Roadway Express).
274. Roadway Express, 931 F.2d at 1092. See Keyser, 800 F. Supp. at 477; Addison v.
Sedco Forex, U.S.A., 798 F. Supp. 1273, 1275 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
275. See Cedillo v. Valcar Enters. & Darling Delaware Co., 773 F. Supp. 932, 939-42
(N.D. Tex. 1991) (workers' compensation retaliation claim could be entertained when pendent
to a related and removable federal question claim under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act).
276. 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 511 (Feb. 3, 1993).
277. Id. at 511 (citing TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, §§ 5.06(1), 5.07(a)(2)
(Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993)).
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senior adoption worker at the Agency, but was rejected because she was
Jewish and the Agency hired Christians only. Speer filed a claim for unlaw-
ful discrimination with the Commission on Human Rights (Commission),
and after investigating her claim, the Commission brought suit on her behalf
against the Agency for violating the CHRA. The trial court held that the
Agency fell within the statutory exception for religious organizations and
rendered judgment for the Agency. The court of appeals affirmed. 27 8 The
supreme court dismissed the appeal as moot, however, because the Agency
had withdrawn from offering adoption services entirely, and the senior adop-
tion worker position sought by Speer had been abolished. 279
In Central Power & Light Co. v. Caballero, 280 Richard Caballero was em-
ployed by Central Power & Light Co. (CPL) as a lineman. Caballero began
experiencing back problems and was examined by a doctor selected by CPL.
Following the exam, the doctor told Caballero that Caballero would no
longer be able to work as a lineman. Caballero was offered an office man-
ager's job by CPL, but he refused and quit his job. Caballero sued CPL for
discrimination based upon his handicap in violation of the CHRA. 281 In
response to five jury questions, the jury found that Caballero had a handicap,
that the handicap did not impair his ability to perform the duties of a line-
man, that the decision to remove Caballero as a lineman was not justified by
business necessity, that Caballero had a $33,000 loss of earnings in the past
and a $200,000 loss of earning capacity in the future, and that Caballero was
entitled to attorney's fees. CPL appealed and argued that the trial court
erred on three counts: (1) in submitting Caballero's claim to a jury because
the CHRA requires the trial court to proceed in equity; (2) in rendering
judgment for damages in an equitable proceeding; and (3) in rendering judg-
ment for damages where Caballero failed to prove non-compliance with a
court order. The court of appeals agreed with CPL and reversed and re-
manded the case. 2 8 2
The court observed that Caballero brought his suit solely on the basis of
violations of the CHRA and that he was accordingly limited to the relief
provided by the Act.2 83 The court held that relief under the CHRA is to be
obtained in an equitable proceeding in the courts, following the administra-
tive decision of the Commission on Human Rights.284 The court noted that
278. 824 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell
Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1772-74
(1992) (discussing court of appeals' opinion).
279. Speer, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 512 (citing General Land Office v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 789
S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1990); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968)).
In his concurring opinion Justice Gonzalez appeared to approve of the eight factors identified
in the court of appeals' opinion in determining whether an entity is a religious entity. Id. at
517 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
280. 804 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ granted).
281. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993). See Philip J.
Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45
Sw. L.J. 3331, 3351-52 (1991) (discussing Caballero facts).
282. Caballero, 804 S.W.2d at 543.
283. Id. at 539-40.
284. Id. at 539. "If the court finds that the respondent has engaged in an unlawful employ-
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Caballero failed to obtain an injunction against CPL from engaging in any
unlawful employment practice. 285 The court also stated that Caballero
failed to prove that CPL had not complied with an order of the court issued
in a civil action brought under the CHRA.286 As a result of the trial court's
action, CPL was deprived of a hearing to determine whether an injunction
was appropriate as required by section 7.01(c) and deprived of a hearing to
determine whether it had failed to comply with an order of the court as
required by section 7.01(g) prior to submitting any factual issues to the
jury. 287 The court also held that award of damages for loss of earnings in
the past and in the future violated the CHRA. 288 The loss of earnings in the
past was not reduced by the amount of "[i]nterim earnings and unemploy-
ment compensation benefits" as set forth in the CHRA. 289 The court noted
that if Caballero's award of damages for loss of past earnings were reduced
by his interim earnings as required, it would entirely eliminate his back pay
award. 290 Further, the award of loss of future earnings is not an element of
damages specified in the CHRA.291 Finally, the court agreed with CPL's
argument that the submission of the questions of the jury regarding loss of
past and future earnings constituted reversible error because the CHRA does
not authorize the submission of such issues to the jury.292
Caballero appealed to the Texas Supreme Court and the court granted his
application for writ of error to consider the following issues: (1) whether
CPL waived any error as to the submission of the issues to the jury or as to
the jury charge by failing to object to the charge or to the issues submitted;
(2) whether article 5221k requires that, prior to conducting a trial by jury
and submitting issues of fact to the jury, the trial judge determine and/or
conduct a hearing to determine whether the court would enjoin any unlawful
employment practice under section 7.01(c), whether CPL failed to comply
with a court order under section 7.01(g), and whether it is expedient, neces-
ment practice as alleged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging
in an unlawful employment practice and order such additional equitable relief as may be ap-
propriate." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(c) (Vernon 1987).
285. Caballero, 804 S.W.2d at 540.
286. Id.
In any case in which an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
fails to comply with an order of a court issued in a civil action brought under
this article, a party to the action or the commission, on the written request of a
person aggrieved by the failure, may commence proceedings to compel compli-
ance with the order.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(g) (Vernon 1987).
287. Caballero, 804 S.W.2d at 541.
288. Id. at 542-43.
289. Id. at 543. "[I]nterim earnings.., and unemployment compensation benefits received
shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable .... " TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 5221k, § 7.01(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1993). The amendment to § 7.01(d)(1) now provides
for the deduction of workers' compensation benefits from any back pay award. Id.
§ 7.01(d)(l) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
290. Caballero, 804 S.W.2d at 543.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 542-43. Under § 7.01 of the CHRA, loss of earnings in the past or back pay is
"additional equitable relief" that may be awarded by the court pursuant to § 7.01(c). TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5221k, § 7.01(c) (Vernon 1987).
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sary, and proper to award Caballero equitable relief pursuant to sections
7.01(c) and 7.01(d) of the CHRA; (3) whether CPL waived any error as to
the trial court's proceeding to trial by jury and submission of issues to the
jury prior to conducting proceedings under sections 7.01(c), 7.01(d) and
7.01(g) by failing to timely file a motion preserving its complaint; and (4)
whether Caballero could elect to take the money damages awarded by the
jury instead of reinstatement with back pay.293
In Brammer v. Martinaire, Inc. ,294 the question was whether two different
dates may be used to satisfy time requirements in two different sections of
the CHRA. Todd Brammer was diagnosed with bone cancer during an ex-
amination for injuring his arm in an on-the-job accident. Brammer was
eventually discharged on May 20, 1988. Brammer and Martinaire allegedly
met to discuss possible re-employment on January 12, 1989. Brammer even-
tually sued alleging that he was discharged because of his handicapped con-
dition. The date of the discriminatory act alleged by Brammer was January
12, 1989, the date of the meeting. Brammer filed with the Commission an
unverified questionnaire on April 24, 1989 and a verified complaint on Sep-
tember 1, 1989. On April 24, 1990, the Commission issued a Notice of
Right to Sue letter, and Brammer filed suit on June 21, 1990. Martinaire
moved for summary judgment on two grounds: first, the April 24 question-
naire filed by Brammer was not verified as required by § 6.01(a), and the
verified complaint filed on September 1 was not filed within the 180-day pe-
riod mandated by that section; and second, the lawsuit was not filed within
the one-year limitation period required by § 7.01. The trial court granted
Martinaire's motion on the second ground and Brammer appealed. The
court of appeals affirmed. 295
Initially the court noted that the supreme court made clear that the provi-
sions of the CHRA are "mandatory and exclusive and must be followed or
the action is not maintainable because of a lack of jurisdiction. ' 296 The
court observed that two of the prerequisites required in § 7.01 before a law-
suit is filed are determined by the complaint filed with the Commission.
29 7
First, the time for filing a lawsuit is based upon the date the complaint is
filed.298 Second, the parties named in the complaint are the only parties that
may be named in the lawsuit. 299 The court concluded that the clear legisla-
tive intent was to require the parties to satisfy the requirements of § 6.01(a)
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to pursuing the private judicial remedy al-
lowed in § 7.01(a). 300
The court sustained Brammer's contention that the verified complaint
293. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 334, 334-35 (Jan. 22, 1992).
294. 838 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ).
295. Id. at 848.
296. Id. at 846 (quoting Schroeder v. Texas Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 488 (Tex.
1991)).






filed on September 1 related back to and satisfied any deficiency in the unver-
ified April 24 questionnaire.30 Therefore, Brammer satisfied the 180-day
jurisdictional requirement of § 6.01(a). 30 2 The court then addressed whether
the one-year limitation period in which to file a lawsuit began to run on
April 24, 1989; if so, Brammer's suit would be untimely because it was filed
on June 24, 1990.303 Brammer argued that the September 1, 1989 date is the
date from which the one-year limitation is determined. Brammer argued
that because the statute requires the filing of a verified complaint and he did
not file his verified complaint until September 1, 1989, that is the date from
which the one-year limitation period should begin to run. The court dis-
agreed and held that application of the relation back provision compelled the
conclusion that both requirements of § 6.01(a) were satisfied on April 24,
1989, and that is the date from which the one-year period must run.3° 4
Brammer also argued that the sending of the right to sue notice extended the
one-year limitation period. The notice was sent on April 24, 1990. Because
§ 7.01(a) allows a party to bring suit within 60 days after the receipt of the
right to sue notice, that provision would toll the statute and his suit would be
timely filed since it was filed within the 60-day period. Citing Green v. Alu-
minum Co. ofAmerica,30 5 the court held that the notice of right to sue letter
does not extend the mandatory one-year statute of limitations in § 7.01 (a).30 6
Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Brammer's suit was not timely
filed and therefore barred under the one-year limitation provision of
§ 7.01(a). 30 7
In Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann,30 8 Marcie Dutschmann sued
Federal Express for retaliatory discharge in connection with her complaints
of sexual harassment against other Federal Express employees. The evi-
dence reflected that Dutschmann complained of sexual harassment, includ-
ing uninvited sexual advances by Aristeo Cuevas, an immediate supervisor,
sexually suggestive jokes and innuendos, and obscenities scratched on her
delivery truck. Additionally, Cuevas masturbated in the Federal Express
vehicle Dutschmann was driving and tried to force her to participate.
Dutschmann notified three supervisors of Cuevas' behavior, but one supervi-
sor told Dutschmann that she was the problem. The jury found for
Dutschmann and Federal Express appealed. The court of appeals af-
firmed. 30 9 Addressing the company's evidentiary challenge to the jury's
finding, the court held that Dutschmann's testimony supported the jury's
301. Id. at 847 (citing 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 327.1(g) (West Supp. 1991) (Tex. Comm'n
Human Rights)).
302. Brammer, 838 S.W.2d at 847.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. 760 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tex. App.-Austin 1988, no writ).
306. Brammer, 838 S.W.2d at 848.
307. Id.
308. 838 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992), afJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 846 S.W.2d 282
(Tex. 1993) (per curiam).




3. Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866311 prohibits discrimination
on the basis of race. 312 In order for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case
under § 1981 in the employment context, the plaintiff must show: (1) that he
belongs to a racial minority; (2) that he applied and was qualified for a job
for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that he was rejected
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination;
and (4) that after he was rejected, the position remained open and the em-
ployer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff's qualifications. 313
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under § 1981, the burden
shifts to the employer to produce evidence of legitimate, race-neutral reasons
for rejecting the plaintiff.31 4 If the employer comes forth with legitimate
reasons for its employment decision, the plaintiff has the opportunity to
show that the employer's reasons are a mere pretext for discrimination. 31 5
The plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that
the employer engaged in unlawful discrimination. 316
In Johnson v. Texas Commerce Bank,317 George Johnson, a black owner
of a referral company that provided computer programmers on a contract
basis, brought a racial discrimination suit under § 1981 against Texas Com-
merce Bank (TCB). Johnson alleged that TCB had rejected computer pro-
grammers that Johnson had offered to TCB but later hired the same
programmers when recommended by nonminority-owned businesses. TCB
filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that there was an absence of
material fact on the issue of unlawful discrimination. In support of its mo-
tion for summary judgment, TCB presented the affidavit of a vice-president
of TCB, who testified that hiring decisions were ultimately made by front-
line supervisors who did not know that the applicants had been recom-
mended by a minority-owned referral company. The vice-president further
testified that TCB quit doing business with Johnson because Johnson did not
custom select applicants to meet TCB's needs. TCB also presented the affi-
davit of the manager of the Programming Department, who testified that she
had interviewed one of Johnson's applicants but did not know that the appli-
310. Id. at 807. The court also found that Federal Express failed to preserve any error
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of retaliatory discharge.
Id.
311. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1992). This article is generally limited to a review of
state law; however, a state court's interpretation of federal employment law is significant and is
reported for this reason.
312. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 (1976).
313. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 n.6 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
314. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
315. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
316. Id.
317. 835 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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cant was recommended by a minority-owned company. The trial court
granted TCB's motion for summary judgment, and Johnson appealed.
The court of appeals reversed and held that the evidence established issues
of material fact on each element of the § 1981 claim. 318 The court first noted
that there was evidence that although the front-line supervisors did not
know that the applicants had been recommended by a minority-owned com-
pany, the supervisors did not make the ultimate hiring decisions; rather, the
supervisors made only recommendations to hire.319 Further, the court ex-
plained that there was some evidence that the vice-president had treated
Johnson's company differently than nonminority companies by objecting to
the excessive number of applicants Johnson had submitted while making no
such objections to nonminority companies. 320 Finally, the court explained
that Johnson had alleged, with evidentiary support, that TCB had engaged
in discriminatory conduct for over four years, while TCB's affidavits only
attempted to justify conduct occurring over a two year period. 321
The court also held that the evidence established an issue of material fact
on the issue of pretext.322 The court explained that TCB had failed to re-
spond to Johnson's allegation that TCB had rejected computer programmers
that Johnson had offered to TCB but later hired the same programmers
when recommended by nonminority-owned businesses. 323 Assuming that
Johnson could prove this allegation, a fact issue would exist as to whether
TCB's "legitimate" reasons for rejecting Johnson's applicants were worthy
of belief.324 The court concluded that TCB's offering of a race-neutral expla-
nation for its employment decisions did serve to rebut Johnson's prima facie
case of racial discrimination, but did not serve to establish the absence of
factual issues on any element of Johnson's prima facie case. 325
4. Unemployment Compensation Act
In Madisonville Consolidated Independent School Dist. v. Texas Employ-
ment Commission,326 Russell, a band director for the Madisonville Consoli-
dated Independent School District (Madisonville), received a "notice of
proposed nonrenewal" of his contract for the coming year. Before Madis-
onville made a final determination as to Russell's renewal, Russell submitted
his resignation. Russell then sought and was awarded unemployment com-
pensation benefits by the Texas Employment Commission. Madisonville
challenged the award, arguing that Russell was disqualified from receiving
benefits because he "left his last work voluntarily without good cause con-
nected with his work."' 327 The trial court upheld the decision of the Com-
318. Id. at 759-60.
319. Id. at 759.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. at 759-60.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 760.
325. Id.
326. 821 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied).
327. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221b-3(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
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mission awarding benefits, and Madisonville appealed.
The court of appeals initially observed that the unemployment compensa-
tion law is remedial in nature and should be construed liberally to effectuate
its purpose: provide compensation to one who becomes unemployed
through no fault of their own, i.e., reasons other than misconduct.3 28 The
court of appeals stated that the issue was "whether knowledge of an impend-
ing discharge, or nonrenewal of a short-term employment contract, is a cir-
cumstance that may justify an employee in quitting, without forfeiting
unemployment benefits."' 329 In affirming the award of benefits, the court of
appeals explained that an employee faced with the threat of an impending
discharge can be characterized as having good cause for voluntarily leaving
his employment or as having a work-related reason of sufficiently urgent,
compelling, and necessitous nature so as to make the separation involun-
tary. 330 The court added, however, that an employee will not be found to
have resigned involuntarily nor to have work-related good cause for his res-
ignation where the employee has a "mere suspicion" that he will be termi-
nated. 331 Rather, an employee who resigns in the face of an impending
termination will be entitled to benefits only if he "has good reason to believe
that he will imminently be discharged, . . . unless he chooses to resign."
332
Concluding that Russell had good cause to believe that he would imminently
be discharged, that any appeals to the school board would be useless, and
that this was "his last chance to resign with dignity as opposed to being
fired,"' 333 the court concluded that Russell was entitled to an award of unem-
ployment benefits. 334
5. Unlawfully Withholding Wages
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coward,335 John Coward sued Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) for breach of employment contract, wrongful dis-
charge and wrongful withholding of wages. The jury found that Wal-Mart
had breached an oral employment agreement, had terminated Coward with-
out just cause, and had withheld Coward's wages. Coward was awarded
$521,660 in damages and Wal-Mart appealed. On appeal, Coward argued
that he was entitled to damages for wrongful withholding of wages based on
breach of the employment contract. The court of appeals disagreed. The
court explained that breach of a duty arising from a contract constitutes
actionable negligence only where there is a common law duty to act even in
the absence of the contract, as in service repair contracts and malpractice
actions. 336 The court then concluded that because there was no common
328. Madisonville, 821 S.W.2d at 311-12.





334. Id. at 314.
335. 829 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied).
336. Id. at 344.
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law duty to pay wages timely, Wal-Mart could not be liable for wrongful
withholding of wages based on the breach of contract theory. 337
Coward also argued that he was entitled to damages for wrongful with-
holding of wages based on Wal-Mart's violation of articles 5156 and 5157,
which provided that employers who willfully failed or refused to pay wages
timely were subject to fines for each such failure or refusal to pay. 338 Again,
the court of appeals disagreed. The court explained that articles 5156 and
5157, because of their remedial and punitive nature, were akin to criminal
statutes. 339 The court then noted that it was not compelled to accept the
standard of care of a criminal statute as the standard for civil liability. 34
The court concluded that violation of articles 5156 and 5157 did not give rise
to civil liability based on failure to timely pay wages. 34' Accordingly, the
court reversed and rendered judgment for Wal-Mart. 342
II. FORUM SELECTION CLAUSES
In Barnette v. United Research Co., Inc. ,343 Howell Barnette entered into a
contract of employment with United Research Company (URC) as a man-
agement consultant. The employment contract was to be governed, inter-
preted, and enforced pursuant to the laws of New Jersey, and the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey or the Superior Court of
New Jersey would be used to resolve disputes between the parties. Barnette
was terminated and he sued in a Texas district court for a variety of tort and
contract claims.344 URC moved to dismiss Barnette's petition based upon
the forum selection clause. The trial court granted URC's motion to dis-
miss, Barnette appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. 345 Barnette ar-
gued that the forum selection clause in his employment contract was
unenforceable for public policy reasons. The court disagreed and held that
contracts that contain venue or forum provisions in contravention of venue
statutes violate public policy, but no such statute applied here. 346 The court
also held that public policy in Texas does not prohibit the enforcement of
forum selection clauses generally and that there is nothing unfair or unrea-
sonable in the agreement to be bound by New Jersey law. 347 Finally, the
court rejected Barnette's claims that his non-contractual theories were
outside the four corners of the employment contract. The court held that
337. Id.
338. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5156, 5157 (Vernon 1987), repealed by TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5155 (Vernon Supp. 1993).




343. 823 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
344. Barnette sued for wrongful termination, age discrimination, intentional infliction of
severe emotional distress, fraudulent inducement to accept employment, and detrimental reli-
ance. Id. at 369.
345. Id. at 370.




Barnette's claims arose from his employment relationship with URC and
implicated the terms of his contract. 348 Accordingly, the court held that the
forum selection clause in Barnette's employment contract was
enforceable. 349
III. NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
Generally, an agreement not to compete is a restraint of trade and is unen-
forceable because it violates public policy. 350 The Texas Constitution de-
clares that monopolies created by the state or a political subdivision are not
permitted because they are contrary to the "genius of a free government."'35'
In 1889, the Texas legislature enacted its first antitrust law, and it remained
almost unchanged until the passage of the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act of 1983.352 Generally, this legislation prohibits contracts, combi-
nations or conspiracies that unreasonably restrain trade or commerce. 35 3
Historically, Texas courts have closely scrutinized private sector contracts
that restrain trade. 354
In Zep Manufacturing Co. v. Harthcock,355 Zep sued its former employee,
Gregory Harthcock, and Harthcock's new employer, Panther Industries, for
breach of a noncompetition agreement. Zep and Panther were business com-
petitors in the manufacture and sale of industrial chemicals. Both compa-
nies developed their own formulas that distinguished their products in the
industry. Because patents are expensive and require disclosure of the
formula, the formulas were generally not patented. Zep protected its
formula and other proprietary information by an employment agreement
with its employees. In 1987 Zep hired Harthcock. When he was hired,
Harthcock did not have a college degree in chemistry nor any experience as
a chemist. Zep trained Harthcock and gave him access to its chemical for-
mulas. Harthcock's duties included quality control of plant production and
analyses of competitive products. Harthcock signed an employment agree-
ment that contained noncompete and nondisclosure covenants. In 1989
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Travel Masters, Inc. v. Star Tours, Inc., 827 S.W.2d 830, 832 (Tex. 1991); Martin v.
Credit Protection Ass'n, Inc., 793 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1990); DeSantis v. Wackenhut
Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 681 (Tex. 1990), cert. denied, IIl S. Ct. 755 (1991) (citing Frankiewicz
v. National Comp. Assocs., 633 S.W.2d 505, 507 (Tex. 1982); Weatherford Oil Tool Co., Inc.
v. Campbell, 161 Tex. 310, 340 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 186 (1981)); Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660,
662 (Tex. 1990).
351. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 26.
352. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.01-.51 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1993).
353. The Texas Supreme Court noted in DeSantis that while a noncompetition agreement
is a restraint on trade, only those contracts that unreasonably restrain trade violate the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983. DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 687.
354. See, e.g., Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-86 (Tex. 1991);
Queens Ins. Co. v. State, 86 Tex. 250, 24 S.W. 397 (1893); Ladd v. Southern Cotton Press &
Mfg. Co., 53 Tex. 172 (1880). See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and
Labor Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1785-97 (1992) (analyzing
factors).
355. 824 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
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Panther contacted Harthcock about an employment opportunity at Panther.
Panther offered Harthcock a job as a chemist and told Harthcock that it
would handle any legal matters regarding his employment with Zep.
Harthcock accepted the job. Zep subsequently sued Harthcock and Panther
for breach of the noncompete and nondisclosure covenants in the employ-
ment agreement. Harthcock and Panther moved for summary judgment as
to all of Zep's claims and the trial court granted the motion. Zep appealed
and the court of appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. 356
The trial court held that the employment contract between Harthcock and
Zep was an unenforceable, at-will contract. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the contract was not an at-will contract, but a satisfaction con-
tract.357 In other words, the lack of a definite duration to the contract did
not make it an at-will contract. 358 Also, the fact that the contract gave the
president of Zep exclusive discretion to determine that Harthcock's job per-
formance was unsatisfactory and the sole discretion to terminate the employ-
ment relationship did not render the contract at-will. 359 The court of
appeals observed that Texas law assumes that an employer will exercise good
faith and imposes a requirement that an employer exercise good faith in eval-
uating whether an employee's performance is satisfactory. 360 Therefore, the
court concluded that the contract was enforceable.361
The court of appeals' determination that the contract was enforceable was
critical to the court's evaluation of the noncompetition agreement. Pursuant
to the Covenant Not To Compete Act 3 6 2 for a covenant not to compete to be
enforceable, it must first be either ancillary to an otherwise enforceable
agreement, or be supported by independent consideration. 363 Because the
trial court concluded that the underlying employment contract was as an at-
will contract, the court concluded that the noncompetition agreement was
unenforceable because it was not ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agree-
ment. The court of appeals' decision that the contract was not an at-will
contract permitted the court to reach the remaining issues as to the reasona-
bleness of the noncompetition covenant.
The noncompetition covenant provided that Harthcock could not perform
356. Id. at 664.





362. The Covenant Not to Compete Act provides that a noncompete covenant is enforcea-
ble if it:
(1) is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement but, if the covenant not to
compete is executed on a date other than the date on which the underlying
agreement is executed, such covenant must be supported by independent valua-
ble consideration; and
(2) contains reasonable limitations as to time, geographical area, and scope of
activity to be restrained that do not impose a greater restraint than is necessary
to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee.




"services similar" to those he performed for Zep for a period of twenty-four
months following the termination of his employment. The covenant did not
have a geographic limitation. Harthcock argued that the covenant was un-
reasonable because it contained no geographic limitation, failed to define
"similar services" and contained an unreasonable time limitation. Because
the noncompetition agreement, if enforced as written, would preclude
Harthcock from working as a chemist anywhere, the court held that cove-
nant was unenforceable on grounds of public policy. 364 While Zep also re-
quested that the trial court reform the noncompetition covenant to impose a
reasonable geographic restriction, which the trial court refused, the appellate
court observed that the Act 365 only provides for reformation in the event
injunctive relief is sought. 366 Because Zep dropped its request for injunctive
relief in response to Harthcock's motion for summary judgment, the court
concluded that Zep no longer sought the only relief available to it upon ref-
ormation of the unenforceable covenant. 367 Accordingly, the court of ap-
peals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment that the noncompetition
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law.368
Zep also argued that the trial court erred in concluding that the nondisclo-
sure covenant was unenforceable as a matter of law. 36 9 Harthcock argued
that the nondisclosure covenant was unenforceable because it was part of the
unenforceable noncompetition covenant, and that it was unenforceable when
analyzed by the same factors as a noncompetition agreement. The court of
appeals rejected Harthcock's argument. The court observed that noncom-
pete covenants and nondisclosure covenants are different, and the fact that
the noncompetition covenant was void did not render the remainder of the
contract void. 370 The court noted that the nondisclosure covenant protected
trade secrets or confidential information learned by Harthcock during his
employment with Zep and did not restrict Harthcock's choice of employ-
ment, prevent him from competing with Zep, or otherwise constitute a re-
straint of trade.3 7 1 Because nondisclosure covenants are not restraints on
364. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 661.
365. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon Supp. 1993), provides:
If the covenant meets the criteria specified by Subdivision (1) of Section 15.50 of
this code [i.e., it is ancillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement] but does not
meet the criteria specified in Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 [i.e., it contains
unreasonable limitations], the court, at the request of the promisee, shall reform
the covenant to the extent necessary to cause the covenant to meet the criteria
specified by Subdivision (2) of Section 15.50 and enforce the covenant as re-
formed, except that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach
of the covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee
shall be limited to injunctive relief.
Id.
366. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 661.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. See Philip J. Pfeiffer & W. Wendell Hall, Employment and Labor Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 1721, 1797-98 (1992) (discussing enforcement of nondisclosure
covenants).




trade, the court concluded that reasonable time, geographic, and scope-of-
activity limitations are not prerequisites to enforceability. 372 Accordingly,
the court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a trial on Zep's
claim for breach of and tortious interference with the nondisclosure
covenant. 373
In B. J. Software Systems, Inc. v. Osina,374 B. J. Software, a company that
marketed and sold computer software systems, was sued for breach of con-
tract by its former primary sales agent, David Osina. B. J. Software counter-
claimed alleging that Osina breached his noncompetition agreement in his
employment contract. The noncompetition agreement provided that Osina
was prohibited from competing with the company while actively represent-
ing the company and prohibited Osina from competing with B. J. Software
after the termination of the agreement for "as long as Osina continue[d] to
receive commissions from [the company] .... f9175 B. J. Software claimed
that Osina actively competed with the company while he was representing
the company, thereby violating the first part of the noncompetition agree-
ment. Osina moved for summary judgment arguing that the noncompetition
agreement was unenforceable as a matter of law. The trial court granted
Osina's motion, and B. J. Software appealed. On appeal Osina challenged
the agreement on three theories: no consideration was given to him by B. J.
Software for the execution of the covenant, Osina was engaged in a "com-
mon calling" as a salesman, and the covenant had no time or geographic
limitations. The court of appeals rejected Osina's arguments. First, the
court held that it was undisputed that the noncompetition covenant was an-
cillary to an otherwise enforceable agreement; therefore, no independent
consideration was required to support the covenant. 376 Second, the court
observed the supreme court abolished the "common calling" doctrine in De-
Santis. 377 Finally, because B.J. Software requested the trial court to reform
the covenant to bring it into compliance with section 15.50, the trial court
had a duty to reform the covenant to make it enforceable or to declare the
covenant incapable of reformation; therefore, the case was reversed and re-
manded to the trial court for reformation of the covenant consistent with the
Act.378
In Centel Cellular Co. of Texas v. Light,379 Debbie Light began working
for United TeleSpectrum (United) in August 1985 as a salesperson and sub-
sequently received several awards for her job performance. On October 8,
372. Id. at 663. The court held that to the extent Unitel Corp. v. Decker, 731 S.W.2d 636
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ), might be interpreted to hold that nondisclo-
sure covenants are governed by the same reasonableness tests as noncompete agreements, it
declined to follow Decker. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 663.
373. Harthcock, 824 S.W.2d at 664.
374. 827 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
375. Id. at 544.
376. Id. at 545.
377. Id. (citing DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d at 682-83). See Webb v. Hartman Newspapers, Inc.,
793 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ) (§ 15.50 of Act effec-
tively abolished common calling defense to non-competition agreement).
378. 827 S.W.2d at 546.
379. 841 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, writ requested).
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1987, Light signed an employment contract with United. The language of
the preamble to the contract provided that United invested heavily in the
training of its employees, that the employees would have close contact with
United's customers, that the employees would acquire confidential cus-
tomer-related information which, if it was acquired by the competition
would damage United, and that if an employee quit to work for a competitor
United would be damaged if the employee took advantage of the confidential
information acquired during employment with United. The contract pro-
vided for Light's employment to cover the Tyler-Longview-Kilgore-Mar-
shall service areas, plus a compensation package. United agreed in the
contract to provide initial and on-going specialized training necessary to sell
mobile radio communication services. The contract provided that it was ter-
minable at will, but also stated that Light was required to give only fourteen
days notice of her decision to terminate and to provide an inventory of
United's property in her possession. Finally, the contract included a cove-
nant that Light agreed not to compete with United for a one year period
following her termination in the Longview-Tyler-Marshall service area, but
also including any future geographic areas covered by United's expansion of
service during Light's employment.
Thereafter, United sold its entire business to Centel Cellular Company of
Texas (Centel). Light continued to work for Centel as a salesperson. In
1988, Light's sales dropped markedly, and she quit her job on May 30, 1988.
Several months later, Light sued Centel alleging that the covenant not to
compete was unenforceable because it constituted an illegal restraint of
trade380 and for tortious interference with prospective contractual relation-
ships. The jury found that Centel tortiously interfered with Light's prospec-
tive contractual relationships and the trial court held that the covenant was
unenforceable. 381 Centel appealed and the court of appeals reversed and
rendered judgment for Centel. 3 2
The court held that the covenant not to compete was ancillary to the Oc-
tober 8, 1987 employment contract which supplemented or amended the ex-
isting oral at-will employment agreement between Light and United by
providing for commission on sales of a new product. 38 3 The court also ob-
served that beginning in September 1987, Light received on-going special
training; therefore, the court found that the covenant was supported by in-
dependent valuable consideration. 384 The court also found that Centel ac-
quired a proprietary and legitimate interest worthy of protection, i.e.,
customer information, through its training of Light and expansion of her
customer base to include other counties. 38 5 Finally, the court noted that the
380. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(1) (Vernon 1987). Section 15.21(a) pro-
vides in part that "[e]very contract ... in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful." Id.
381. Light, 841 S.W.2d at 97.
382. Id. at 99-100.
383. Id. at 99.
384. Id. at 99-100 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(1) (Vernon Supp. 1992);
Martin v. Credit Protection Ass'n, 793 S.W.2d 667, 670 (Tex. 1990)).
385. Light, 841 S.W.2d at 100 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50 DeSantis;
793 S.W.2d at 682; Martin, 793 S.W.2d at 670).
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covenant was for one year, it covered only three counties, and applied only
to activities of Light that would permit her use of customer-related informa-
tion she acquired during her employment with United and Centel.386 The
court concluded that the covenant was reasonable under the statute and the
common law; therefore, Light did not have a cause of action under
§ 15.21(a)(1).387 Because the covenant was reasonable, the court held that
Centel had a right to assert the contractual provisions under the covenant. 388
Accordingly, the court found that Centel was privileged or justified as a mat-
ter of law to assert its rights under the covenant, and the jury's affirmative
finding of tortious interference with prospective business relationships was
reversed and rendered for Centel. 38 9
IV. BEYOND NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENTS
In addition to actions based on a breach of contract theory arising from a
noncompetition agreement, employers may rely on various causes of action
to protect trade secrets against appropriation by former employees and dis-
closure to competitors. 390 An employer may sue for unfair competition,
which is based on fraud in which a party has suffered or will suffer conse-
quential harm. Two elements are necessary to obtain injunctive or mone-
tary relief: existence of a trade secret and its unconsented use or
disclosure. 39 1 This cause of action is separate and apart from any breach of
contract for alleged violation of a noncompetition agreement. Additionally,
an employer may sue for breach of nondisclosure contract, if one exists, or
breach of confidential relationship. 392
In Texas, a trade secret is defined as:
[A]ny formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitor who do not know or use it. It may be a
formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating
or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list
of customers . ... 393
Secrecy is key to establishing the existence of a trade secret. The informa-
386. Light, 841 S.W.2d at 100.
387. Id. at 100-01 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50(2); DeSantis, 793 S.W.2d
at 682; Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. 1983)).
388. Light, 841 S.W.2d at 100.
389. Id. at 101.
390. See also P. Jerome Richey & Margaret J. Bosik, Trade Secrets and Restrictive Cove-
nants, 4 LAB. LAW. 21 (1988).
391. See id. at 22-25.
392. Gonzales v. Zamora, 791 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ)
("Protection is available even in the absence of an express agreement not to disclose materials;
when a confidential relationship exists, the law will imply an agreement not to disclose trade
secrets.").
393. Hyde Corp. v. Huffines, 158 Tex. 566, 586, 314 S.W.2d 763, 776, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
898 (1958) (adopting definition in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939)). See
Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ)
(customer lists and pricing information are trade secrets).
1452 [Vol. 46
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
tion may not be readily available or generally known; 394 "however, when
money and time are invested in the development of a procedure or device
which is based on an idea which is not new to a particular industry, and
when that certain procedure or device is not generally known, trade secret
protection will exist."' 395 One court placed importance on the efforts made
by the employer to keep the information at issue from competitors.3 96 Thus,
if the information provides a competitive advantage to its user, it may be a
trade secret. 397 Other factors considered by the courts include the existence
of a nondisclosure agreement and the nature and extent of security precau-
tions to prevent unauthorized disclosure or use of the information.398 On
the other hand, where the procedures and equipment used in a business are
well known within an industry or generally known and readily available, the
training and knowledge gained by an employee about the procedures are
unlikely to be considered protectable interests. 399 Additionally, former em-
ployees are free to use general knowledge, skill, and experience acquired dur-
ing employment 4°° or information publicly disclosed.4° 1
Generally, employers can protect secret customer lists and other confiden-
tial information from use by former employees and preclude the employee
from using it in competition with the employer. For example, a former em-
ployee may not use knowledge of purchasing agents and credit ratings of the
customers of his former employer to compete against that employer.4°2 Sim-
ilarly, one court granted an injunction to prevent a former employee from
competing against his former employer through the use of disparaging re-
marks about his former employer's products based on the employee's inside
knowledge and experience. 4° 3 Thus, if secret information comes into an em-
ployee's possession due to a confidential relationship with the employer, the
employee has a duty not to commit a breach of the confidence by disclosing
394. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 264 (suit involving breach of confidential relationship and
unfair competition).
395. Id. (emphasis added); see Bryan v. Kershaw, 366 F.2d 497, 500 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 959 (1967); Ventura Mfg. Co. v. Locke, 454 S.W.2d 431, 433 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1970, no writ).
396. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 265.
397. Murrco Agency, 800 S.W.2d at 605 n.7.
398. See Daily Int'l Sales Corp. v. Eastman Whipstock, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ); Rimes v. Club Corp. of Am., 542 S.W.2d 909, 913
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, writ refd n.r.e.) (information learned during employment for
which there was no duty of nondisclosure imposed by the employer may be used freely by the
employee after employment termination).
399. See Recon Exploration, Inc. v. Hodges, 798 S.W.2d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1990, no writ) (geophysical exploration procedures known in the trade); Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d
at 264; Hall v. Hall, 326 S.W.2d 594, 600-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(manner of making and installing product widely known). See also Wissman v. Boucher, 150
Tex. 326, 330, 240 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (1951) (common knowledge is not a trade secret).
400. Executive Tele-Communications Sys. v. Buchbaum, 669 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1984, no writ).
401. Gonzales, 791 S.W.2d at 764.
402. Crouch v. Swing Mach. Co., 468 S.W.2d 604, 605-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1971, no writ).
403. Johnston v. American Speedreading Academy, Inc., 526 S.W.2d 163, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
1993] 1453
SMU LAW REVIEW
or otherwise using it to the employer's disadvantage.4"" When a former em-
ployee commits the tort of unfair competition, an employer may be able to
enjoin the employee from using or disclosing the secret or confidential infor-
mation.405 In addition, monetary damages can be awarded for lost profits
based on the difference between the employer's market position before and
after the misappropriation of the confidential information. 40 6
In Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods, Inc.,47 Butts Retail entered into a
franchise agreement with Diversifoods, the franchisor, for a five year period
to operate a retail fruit and nut store known as Tropik Sun Fruit & Nut at
Parkdale Mall in Beaumont. The franchise agreement contained two restric-
tive covenants which provided:
(1) that if, prior to the expiration of the franchise agreement, [Butts
Retail] terminated the franchise agreement, [Butts Retail] was prohib-
ited from operating a business selling fruit and nuts in Parkdale Mall
for a period of two years from the date . . . [Butts Retail] ceased to
conduct business pursuant to th[e] agreement, and (2) that during the
five year term of the agreement, [Butts Retail] would not operate an-
other business selling fruit and nuts within the metropolitan area of the
Parkdale Mall store in Beaumont, Texas. 408
Two years later, Butts Retail opened a fruit and nut store called Mr.
Munch in Central Mall in Port Arthur. Diversifoods sent a letter to Butts
Retail terminating the franchise agreement; however, Butts Retail continued
to operate the store at Parkdale Mall and made royalty payments and oper-
ated as a Tropik Sun Fruit & Nut franchise. Diversifoods sued Butts Retail
for, inter alia, breach of the franchise agreement and breach of the non-
competition clauses. The jury awarded Diversifoods approximately $7,000
and $41,000 in lost profits for the Parkdale Mall (Beaumont) and Central
Mall (Port Arthur) locations, respectively, and $45,000 in attorneys' fees.
Butts Retail appealed.
On appeal, Butts Retail contended that the non-competition clauses were
unenforceable. As to the first covenant, the court applied the statutory stan-
dards under the Covenant Not to Compete Act 40 9 and, without discussing
application of the standards to the facts, the court concluded that the cove-
nant not to compete as to Parkdale Mall was reasonable as a matter of law,
and affirmed the award of damages attributable to Parkdale Mall.410 As to
the second covenant, the court was required to determine whether the term
"metropolitan area" was sufficiently precise to describe the geographical
area, i.e., whether the term included Central Mall in Port Arthur. Because
404. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. O'Donnell, 627 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
405. Elcor Chem. Corp. v. Agri-Sul, Inc., 494 S.W.2d 204, 212-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
406. Huffines, 158 Tex. at 585, 314 S.W.2d at 776.
407. 840 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ requested).
408. Id. at 773.
409. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.50-.51.
410. Butts Retail, 840 S.W.2d at 773. The court's decision appears to based upon the fact
that the jury awarded less damages than proved by Diversified at trial. Id. at 773-74.
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the term was not defined in the franchise agreement, Diversifoods urged the
court to take judicial notice that the cities of Beaumont, Port Arthur and
Orange are in the same metropolitan area. The court declined to do so be-
cause the "fact" was subject to reasonable dispute.41 1 As a result, the cove-
nant preventing any other business within the metropolitan area of Parkdale
Mall (Beaumont) was unreasonable and unenforceable as applied to Central
Mall (Port Arthur); therefore, the court reversed the judgment awarding
damages to Diversifoods as to the Central Mall location in Port Arthur and
rendered that Diversifoods take nothing as to its claims for lost profits as to
Central Mall.412
In M. N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop,413 Charles Brummerhop was
a stockholder and salesman for Dannenbaum, a process equipment sales
company. Brummerhop resigned from Dannenbaum, and approximately
one month later, Brummerhop was approached by his son, who also worked
for Dannenbaum, and asked if he would meet with three Dannenbaum em-
ployees who were dissatisfied with Dannenbaum. These employees met with
Brummerhop and asked him to start a business competing with Dan-
nenbaum. Brummerhop agreed and subsequently, the three Dannenbaum
employees resigned and went to work for Brummerhop in competition with
Dannenbaum. Brummerhop then contacted Gestra, one of Dannenbaum's
suppliers, and asked if Gestra would consider allowing Brummerhop to rep-
resent the Gestra line of products. Gestra solicited a proposal from Brum-
merhop and Dannenbaum, and subsequently awarded its business to
Brummerhop and terminated its contract with Dannenbaum. Dannenbaum
sued Brummerhop and Gestra. Among many claims and counterclaims, one
of Dannenbaum's claims against Brummerhop was for wrongful appropria-
tion of confidential information. The trial court submitted to the jury the
following instruction as to this claim:
You are instructed that confidential information means any process, in-
formation or compilation of information, formula, pattern, or device
which is used in one's business and which gives an opportunity to ob-
tain an advantage over competitors who do not know of or use it. In
order to be confidential there must be a substantial element of secrecy;
however, secrecy need not be absolute. Matters of public knowledge or
of general knowledge in an industry cannot be appropriated as confiden-
tial. The personal efficiency, inventiveness, skills and experience which
an employee develops through his work belong to him and not his for-
mer employer.414
The jury found that there was no wrongful appropriation by Brummerhop.
On appeal, Dannenbaum first complained that the last sentence of the in-
struction was an incorrect statement of Texas law, but the court concluded
411. Id. at 774 (citing TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201).
412. Id. at 774-75. The court also reversed the award of attorneys' fees to Diversifoods and
remanded that issue to the trial court so that the portion of attorneys' fees attributable to the
covenant at Parkdale Mall (which Diversifoods was entitled to recover) could be segregated
and proved. Id.
413. 840 S.W.2d 624 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
414. Id. at 631.
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that it could not find any authority that supported Dannebaum's argu-
ment. 415 Dannenbaum next complained that the third sentence was im-
proper because there can be wrongful appropriation of information
accessible on the open market. The court observed that the cases regarding
misappropriation of confidential information discuss "(1) whether the infor-
mation was confidential, or (2) even if such information was readily accessi-
ble, whether the former employee acquired the information lawfully. '416
The court noted that confidential business information may often be ob-
tained by observation, experimentation, or general inquiry and that ob-
taining confidential information in this way is lawful. 417  The court
acknowledged that the courts have great difficulty determining whether cus-
tomer information is confidential and thus capable of misappropriation. 418
Observing the RESTATEMENT guidelines regarding a former employee's use
of confidential information, the court noted that the RESTATEMENT distin-
guishes between written customer information and customer names retained
in the former employee's memory. 419 The court observed, however, that
Texas courts do not apply the memory rule.420 Rather, some Texas cases
analyze the difficulty in obtaining customer lists in determining whether
such lists are confidential information and hold that if the information is
readily accessible by industry inquiry, then the lists are not protected, 421
while other Texas cases hold that even if the information is readily accessi-
ble, if the competitor gained the information in usable form while working
for the former employer, then the information is protected. 422 The court
held that the instruction essentially provided that information one could
readily obtain in the general industry could not be appropriated as confiden-
tial; therefore, it was not error because there was support in the cases for
such an instruction. 423
415. Id. at 631-32.
416. Id. at 632 (citing Mercer v. C. A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232, 1238-39 (5th Cir.
1978); Jeter Associated Rack Corp., 607 S.W.2d 272, 275-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Brooks v. American Biomedical
Corp., 503 S.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Crouch v.
Swing Mach. Co., 468 S.W.2d 604, 606-08 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1971, no writ)).
417. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 632.
418. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 632.
419. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958)).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 632-33 (citing Numed, Inc. v. McNutt, 724 S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Allan J. Richardson & Assocs., Inc., v. Andrews, 718 S.W.2d 833,
836-37 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ); Brooks, 503 S.W.2d at 684-85; Re-
search Equip. Co., Inc. v. C. H. Galloway & Scientific Cages, Inc., 485 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); SCM Corp. v. Triplett Co., 399 S.W.2d 583, 586-88 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ)).
422. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d at 633 (citing American Precision Vibrator Co. v. National
Air Vibrator Co., 764 S.W.2d 274, 276-78 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ);
Jeter, 607 S.W.2d at 275-76; Crouch, 468 S.W.2d at 607-08).




V. ERISA AND WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
The primary purpose of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA)424 is to protect the interests of participants in employee benefit
plans and their beneficiaries. 425 Accordingly, ERISA requires disclosure
and reporting, establishes certain fiduciary standards of conduct, responsibil-
ity, and obligation, and authorizes appropriate penalties against employers,
trustees, and other entities who fail to comply with its mandates.426 With
respect to employment status, ERISA strictly prohibits discharging an em-
ployee under certain circumstances. 4 27
The United States Supreme Court defined the breadth and impact of the
ERISA preemption doctrine in several significant decisions: FMC Corp. v.
Holliday,428 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon,429 Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Taylor,430 Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux,43 1 Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,43 2 and Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.433
In those decisions, the Supreme Court expressly held that the preemption
clause of ERISA provides that ERISA supersedes all state laws insofar as
they relate to any employee benefit plan, except state laws that regulate
insurance.4 34 Recognizing that the preemption provisions of ERISA are
deliberately expansive, the Supreme Court observed that Congress provided
explicit direction that ERISA preempts common law causes of action filed
in state court.435  The Fifth Circuit 436  and the Texas Supreme
424. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
425. Id. § 1001(b).
426. Id.
427. Id. § 1140. Under ERISA, an employer cannot discharge an employee "for exercising
any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit plan... or for the
purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which such [employee] may become
entitled under the plan .... " Id.
428. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
429. 498 U.S. 133 (1990).
430. 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
431. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
432. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
433. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
434. There are limited exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1003(b), 1144
(1988).
435. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 44-45.
436. Hogan v. Kraft Foods, 969 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1992) (ERISA preempted plain-
tiff's claims for breach of contract, violations of TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 and TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress); Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d
1209, 1218-19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 68 (1992) (ERISA preempted claims for
fraud, civil conspiracy, breach of employment contract, unlawful interference with contract
rights, negligence and gross negligence); Lee v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 894 F.2d 755,
756-58 (5th Cir. 1990) (ERISA preempted fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims); Ra-
mirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760, 762-64 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA preempted
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21); Boren v. N.L Indus., Inc., 889 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (5th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3283 (1990) (ERISA preempted claim for breach of contract);
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1293-97 (5th Cir. 1989) (ERISA preempted
plaintiff's breach of contract claim); Degan v. Ford Motor Co., 869 F.2d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.
1989) (ERISA preempted claim for breach of an oral agreement to pay early retirement bene-
fits); Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1290 (5th Cir. 1988)
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Court437 have repeatedly recognized ERISA's broad preemption of common
law claims that relate to an employee benefit plan.
In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden4 38 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed who is an employee under ERISA. Robert Darden operated an in-
surance agency according to the terms of several contracts he signed with
Nationwide. In exchange for his promise to sell only Nationwide insurance
policies, Nationwide agreed to enroll Darden in a company retirement plan.
Nationwide eventually ended its relationship with Darden, and Darden be-
came an independent insurance agent and sold insurance policies for Nation-
wide's competitors. As a result, Nationwide disqualified him from the
retirement plan. Darden sued for the benefits under ERISA, which permits
a benefit plan "participant" to enforce the substantive provisions of ER-
ISA.439 Thus, the issue was whether Darden was an "employee," a term
defined as "any individual employed by an employer." 44 The district court
granted summary judgment to Nationwide on the basis that the total factual
context of Darden's relationship with Nationwide showed that he was an
independent contractor and not an employee. 4 ' The Fourth Circuit re-
versed. The court noted that while Darden would not qualify as an em-
ployee under traditional agency principles, it held that the traditional
definition was inconsistent with the declared policy and purposes of ER-
ISA."42 The court concluded that an "employee" under ERISA is one (1)
who had a reasonable expectation of receiving pension benefits, (2) relied on
this expectation, and (3) lacked the economic bargaining power to contract
out of benefit plan forfeiture provisions." 3
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit. Finding ERISA's defini-
tion of employee "nominal," the Court adopted a common law test for deter-
(ERISA preempted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, equitable estoppel, breach
of contract, and fraud).
437. Gorman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 811 S.W.2d 542, 546 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 88 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiffs' claim for breach of contract, common law fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, statutory
violations under TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.62 and 21.21, violations of applicable regulatory
orders issued by the State Board of Insurance, and deceptive trade practices under the TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46-.62); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Small, 806 S.W.2d 800, 801
(Tex. 1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act); Cathey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 805 S.W.2d 387, 388-90 (Tex.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2855 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiffs claims under the Texas Insurance Code and the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Pan Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Erbauer Constr. Co., 805 S.W.2d
395-96 (Tex.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 86 (1991) (ERISA preempted plaintiffs claims for bad
faith settlement practices in violation of the Texas Insurance Code and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act).
438. 112 S. Ct. 1344 (1992).
439. ERISA defines "participant" as "any employee or former employee of an employer
... who is or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit
plan ... " 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988).
440. Id. § 1002(6).





mining who qualifies as an "employee" under ERISA.444 The Court relied
on its previous definition in Community for Creative Non- Violence v. Reid" 5
for an appropriate definition of the general common law determination of an
employee." 6 The Court also rejected the broad definition of employee under
the Fair Labor Standards Act and concluded that the "textual asymmetry"
between FLSA and ERISA precludes reliance on FLSA cases when constru-
ing the definition of "employee" under ERISA." 7 Finally, the Court held
that the Fourth Circuit's test would only cause employers more confusion in
determining who their employees are." 8 While the Fourth Circuit predicted
that Darden would probably not qualify as an employee under traditional
agency principles, it did not decide the issue; therefore, the Court reversed
and remanded the case to the court of appeals." 9
CONCLUSION
The past year has once again been one of numerous developments in labor
and employment law. With the expected increased level of federal attention
and legislation concerning employment matters, all employers will be re-
quired to deal with an ever increasingly complex web of employment laws
and issues. Management and defense counsel must carefully monitor devel-
opments in this area. The operational impact and the economic risks that
flow from employment law developments and employment-related decisions
are significant and clearly justify vigilant study.
444. Id. at 1348.
445. 490 U.S. 730, 740 (1989).
446. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1348. Quoting Reid, the Court summarized the definition as
follows:
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common
law of agency, we consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished. Among the other factors relevant
to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the
parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to
work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assist-
ants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party;
whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and
the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 1348 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751-52).
447. Darden, 112 S. Ct. at 1350.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 1350-51.
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